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Georgia has since independence struggled with the issue of stable energy supply. After the 
Rose Revolution in 2003, the Georgian society went through significant changes where many 
challenges were successfully dealt with, including an evident reduction in corruption. 
Nevertheless, the issue of energy supply continued to be troublesome. An important part of 
the new energy policy introduced in 2006 was the utilising of domestic hydropower resources. 
Having one of Europe's largest untapped hydropower potential the Georgian politicians 
wanted to maximise this opportunity, however, the country did not have the human resources 
and finances to do so. Following a neoliberal approach where FDI is considered 
unquestionably beneficial, it was decided to attract FDI so that greenfield hydropower plants 
would be constructed. 
  
This thesis analyses the impacts of FDI in the hydropower sector after 2006, and the main 
question is in what ways the Georgian government’s search for FDI in the hydropower sector 
have had an impact on social and environmental aspects of the society. This thesis is a case 
study of two foreign companies that will construct greenfield hydropower plants in the 
Autonomous Republic of Ajara. The analysis is mainly based on 18 interviews with different 
stakeholders in the Georgian hydropower sector in November 2012, but also utilises 
secondary literature. By looking beyond the quantitative numbers of FDI, this thesis aims at 
shedding light on how the different stakeholders evaluate the greenfield hydropower 
development and its challenges. If properly managed, FDI may contribute to development 
both for the country and the affected population. The purpose is to find out how the two cases 
fit in to the development after 2006, and how they affect in terms of the environmental, 
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“We must make every family feel the achievements in the field of energy.” 
Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili.  




















Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia has been struggling to become a democracy with a 
well-functioning market economy. After the Rose Revolution in 2003 the Saakashvili 
government introduced comprehensive reforms, which have resulted in many 
accomplishments, including a clear reduction in corruption and the peaceful reintegration of 
the Autonomous Republic of Ajara
1
. Another important achievement has been an 
improvement in energy supplies, including a commitment to utilise Georgia’s own 
hydropower potential. 
Having struggled with unreliable energy supplies since independence, Georgia wanted to 
develop its domestic hydropower potential, but lacked the financial strength and human 
know-how to do so. Accordingly, the country therefore introduced several measures to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the hydropower sector. There are several advantages 
associated with FDI and hydropower projects, with potential economic benefits that include 
taxes from investments, foreign cooperation, job creation, the introduction of new technology 
and know-how, and a more stable energy supply. It is interesting to look at how and to what 
extent the government has achieved its initial plan to get as much as possible in return for FDI 
in large hydropower. It appears there is a consensus among the Georgian political elite that 
FDI is advantageous for the country, and it raises the question whether politicians have placed 
higher value on FDI than on other important aspects of development, such as potential 
environmental and social consequences. 
Through a case study of two foreign hydropower investors in Ajara, this thesis seeks to 
examine the impact of FDI in the Georgian hydropower sector since 2006. With Georgia 
being labelled as “the number one reformer in the world” in 2007 by the World Bank’s Ease 
of Doing Business Index, Georgian politicians are eager to implement reforms 
(worldbank.org). However, the index tells one story, while the lives of ordinary citizens tell a 
rather different story. Living in Batumi in the spring of 2012, I could see the significant 
contrast between the constructions of ultramodern buildings in the city while the citizens 
                                                 
1
 Different spellings the autonomous republic include Adjara, Adzhara, Ajaria, Adjaria, Adzharia, Achara, 
Acharia, Ajaristan and Ajara. Even the government is inconsistent in its spelling, but since it is officially named 
the Government of Autonomous Republic of Ajara, Ajara will be used in this thesis. 
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experienced power cuts almost every week. Working as an intern at a hydropower company, I 
asked myself in what way the ongoing development would be beneficial to Georgia. 
1.1 Previous research 
Most of the existing literature on FDI in the energy sector in the South Caucasus is related to 
the oil and gas sectors in neighbouring Azerbaijan (see e.g. Oksan 2010, Mehdiyeva 2011). 
There is only a small amount of literature related to FDI in the hydroelectric sector in the 
South Caucasus or other similar post-soviet countries (e.g. Løchen 2011). Apart from some 
reports by local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), few if any studies have thoroughly 
addressed the environmental and social impact of hydropower development. The few relevant 
studies tend to be investor oriented (e.g. USAID 2010, Econ 2010). Despite its importance, 
the long-term impact of energy reform on the national economy has barely been studied 
(Lampietti 2004, 25). 
1.2 Research question 
In the context of Georgia’s quest to become a net exporter of hydropower electricity, I hope 
that the thesis will make a contribution to understanding hydropower development in Georgia. 
Therefore, this thesis will look at whether and to what degree the construction of new 
hydropower facilitates the social and economic situation in the country. The main research 
question of this thesis is as follows: In what ways does the quest for FDI in Georgia’s 
hydropower sector have an impact on social and environmental aspects?   
Furthermore, the following sub-questions will be addressed in order to clarify important 
aspects of this development; 
 What has been Georgia’s strategy for attracting FDI in the greenfield hydropower 
sector? 
 What is the status of property rights in Georgia, and how does it affect the land 
acquisition process during the two projects? 
 To what degree does FDI in the energy sector affect the environmental standards? 
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 To what extent will the two cases examined in this thesis contribute to improvement in 
the affected areas, for instance, in terms of tax revenues, employment possibilities and 
communication flow between the companies and the affected population?  
 The following section gives more information about the two cases that will be examined in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
1.3 Presentation of the two cases 
In this section I will introduce the two case studies to be examined in this thesis, namely Ajar 
Energy 2007 and Adjaristsqali LLC. The two cases have similarities, including that the 
companies are both subsidiaries developing their first hydropower project. The location for 
both projects is the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, near the Turkish border. Both companies 
come from countries with a long tradition of hydropower. The projects are the results of the 
Georgian government’s commitment to attracting FDI and the development of greenfield 
hydropower since 2006. In addition, both projects will export most of the electricity produced 
to Turkey and will provide electricity to the domestic market only during the high-demand 
winter months, a service they are legally obliged to provide during the first ten years of their 
operation (menr.gov.ge 2011b). Both projects have been delayed because the projected 
production start-up dates have been pushed back, but nevertheless they have developed far 
enough that it is expected that both projects will be completed.  
1.3.1 Ajar Energy 2007 
Ajar Energy 2007 Ltd, referred to hereinafter as the Ajar project, is a subsidiary of the well-
established Turkish company Eksim Investment Holding. Eksim Investment Holding is a 
large investment group in Turkey with assets both at home and abroad. The group’s 
investment portfolio includes businesses in many sectors such as energy, mining, real estate 
and construction. In the hydropower sector, the company has long experience and holds 
project portfolios with a capacity over 350 MW (Eksim.com 2011).  
As the name indicates, the company was established in 2007, and the case to be studied is the 
subsidiary’s first hydropower project. The Ajar project reached a preliminary agreement with 
the Georgian government in February 2008 and a full agreement in June 2009. With this 
agreement, the company received a concession to utilise the potential of the lower part of the 
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Chorokhi River in Ajara. Chorokhi is a trans-boundary river with the main part located in 
Turkey. The company has an office in Batumi, where it currently employs both Turks and 
Georgians. Preliminary studies for the project started in 2011. In 2012 the company obtained 
a construction license, and construction work started in the same year. The hydropower 
project is expected to be completed by 2016 (investinbatumi.ge 2011).  
The Ajar project plans to construct two plants, the Kirnati and the Kelvachauri hydropower 
plants. The projected installed capacity is 74 MW and the estimated cost is more than 125 
million USD. If the project should be completed within the projected time, it will become the 
first-large scale greenfield hydropower project in Georgia as a result of the energy policy that 
was been in place since 2006 (UNFCCC 2006, 15). The development process started 
somewhat earlier for the Ajar project, and therefore it has progressed further in comparison 
with the Adjaristqali LLC. 
1.3.2 Adjaristsqali Georgia LLC 
Adjaristsqali Georgia LLC, referred to hereinafter as the AGL project, is a subsidiary of the 
Norwegian-based company Clean Energy Group (CEG). The ownership of the company is 
divided between CEG’s management team and Norsk Mineral AS, a Norwegian industrial 
company with interests in energy, as well as other sectors. In addition, CEG has signed a joint 
development agreement with IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, making the 
international financial institution a co-developer of the project (cleanenergygroup.no 2011a).  
According to the company’s website, CEG was set up to “develop greenfield hydro projects 
in countries with sustainable energy framework and untapped hydro potential” 
(cleanenergygroup.no 2012b). The project in Ajara is its very first project. However, the 
company’s founders have considerable experience in the Norwegian hydropower sector with 
companies such as Statkraft. The project is located in the mountainous areas of Ajara, not far 
from the Turkish border. More precisely, it is located by the Adjaristsqali River and its 
tributaries. The river is 90km long and has an average height of 1,400m above sea level. The 
river gets its inflows from rainfall (44%), groundwater (30%) and snowmelt (26%) (UNFCCC 
2012, 4). The Adjaristsqali River joins the Chorokhi River from the east at a point 
approximately 17km from the Black Sea (UNFCCC 2012, 4). 
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AGL took part in a tender process in March 2010 and was awarded the development rights 
about a month later. It took a year to negotiate the agreement, which was finally signed in 
June 2011 (UNFCCC 2012, 27). The estimated cost of the project is between 300 and 700 
million USD, which may make this hydropower project one of the largest FDI investments in 
the country (cleanenergygroup.no 2011a). At the time of writing, the company has not yet 
received a construction licence, but it is expected that this will be granted in May 2013. From 
2012, AGL had both Georgians and international staff working in the company offices in 
Batumi and on location (cleanenergygroup.no 2012). 
The plan is to construct two hydropower plants. The Shuakhevi hydropower plant will have 
an installed capacity of 185 MW (cleanenergygroup.no 2011a). The second hydropower plant 
is called Koromkheti, and it is projected to have an installed capacity of 150 MW 
(MacDonald 2012, 14). Providing all goes according to plan, the start of the operational phase 
for the two plants will be in 2016 and 2018, respectively (cleanenergygroup.no 2012).  
1.4 Concepts 
Here I will explain some of the concepts that are vital for understanding the discussion in this 
thesis. First is the term foreign direct investment (FDI), defined as a financial investment in 
an enterprise that operates in a different country of origin than the investor. International 
organisations such as the OECD often define FDI as a situation where the proportion of 
foreign ownership is equal to or greater than 10% of the shares in a corporation (Zarsky 2005, 
15). The IMF defines it as “a category of cross-border investment associated with a resident in 
one economy having control or a significant degree of influence on the management of an 
enterprise that is resident in another economy” (IMF 2009, 100). The IMF also uses the 10% 
rule noted above (IMF 2009, 101). This thesis examines two cases, both of which are 
hydropower companies fully under foreign ownership with the entirety of the financing 
coming from outside Georgia. The companies are in the form of subsidiaries, often known as 
daughter companies. The IMF defines a subsidiary as “a direct investment enterprise over 
which the direct investor is able to exercise control” (IMF 2009, 101). The cases have a 
normal multinational structure with national mother companies in Turkey and Norway, 
respectively, which have both established a Georgian subsidiary. 
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FDI is a part of the global financial economy, and it is associated with theories on economic 
growth (Zarsky 2005, 99). However, the notion that FDI promotes growth has been much 
debated, and the outcome can depend on several factors (Moran, Graham et al. 2005, 197). 
Therefore, it is vital to recognise that FDI is not a homogeneous phenomenon. In terms of this 
thesis, the investments are both in the energy sector, more precisely in hydropower. FDI 
might contribute to national development if the country’s export competitiveness is increased, 
and if human skills and technology are upgraded. These and other positive side effects of FDI 
are called spillover. On the other hand, FDI might result in negative impacts, such as 
outcrowding the national companies, unsustainable environmental consequences and social 
unrest (Zarsky 2005, 98). 
Furthermore, the thesis deals with a specific type of FDI, namely investment in a greenfield 
project, which occurs when a new unit of production is built. The cases in this thesis are 
hydropower plants built from scratch. Mergers and acquisitions constitute the other form of 
FDI, which is when foreign companies buy existing assets (Lee and Vivarelli 2004, 158). The 
greenfield hydropower plants are part of Georgia’s energy development strategy. 
Development is a term with multiple connotations, but in this thesis it will be broadly defined 
as a country’s change in terms of economic growth. It can also be simply defined as 
improvement in the lives of citizens (Inadomi 2010, 17). For instance, the availability and 
affordability of energy has the potential to contribute to economic growth and improve the 
standard of living in Georgia. 
The hydropower sector is divided into three segments along the value chain. The first is 
generation where the actual production of energy happens in hydropower plants. This 
segment is the focus of the thesis, as the two companies are the owners and builders of the 
plants. The second segment is transmission, whereby electricity is transferred from the plant 
and distributed. Finally, there is the retailing of the electricity (investinbatumi.ge 2011). In 
terms of hydropower plants, an output of less than 10 MW is considered to be a small plant 
(Demirbaş 2002s, 35). In Georgia, plants with less than 13 MW capacity do not need a 
generation license and are exempt from comprehensive social and environmental assessments 
(investinbatumi.ge 2011). The cases in this thesis are larger than 13 MW and thereby subject 
to the studies.  
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It is also worth defining some terminology linked to Georgian society. First, there is the issue 
on whether the Soviet Union should be called a communist, soviet or socialist society. Some 
argue that in reality the USSR never fully achieved its communist ideals and the term 
socialism has taken different forms all over the world and thus, I prefer to use the term soviet 
as I find it more relevant to describe the Georgian past reality (Papava 2005, 17). This leads to 
another question regarding whether one should label Georgia as a post-soviet country; for 
how long should the country be labelled as such? Some have argued that the successor states 
of the Soviet Union are more shaped by the soviet past than the Eastern European countries 
(e.g. Stiglitz 1999). Although Georgia has changed substantially since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, some of the features still remain such as a large bureaucracy. 
Transition is yet another tricky term used by a number of academics (e.g. Pelkmans 2006; 
Neuhaus 2006; Jones 2013). The term is somewhat problematic since every society is in 
transition in the sense that no society stands completely still, and therefore some scholars 
have referred to the process that took place across Eastern Europe and the Caucasus in the 
1990s as transformation (e.g. Rose 2009; Åslund 2006). Transformation is swift and 
pervasive, but as Rose notes, perhaps Eastern European politicians and Western economists 
may have preferred to refer to the process in the early 1990s as transition, since this implies 
predictability and knowledge of where one is headed, instead of the more uncertain 
connotations of transformation (2009, 1). This thesis will refer to a Georgian transformation 
period in terms of moving from one economic and political system to another during the early 
1990s. The period after transformation will be referred to as an ongoing transition (Papava 
2005, 16–17). 
1.5 Outline of thesis 
This thesis has six chapters, organised into two main parts. The first part consists of chapter 
one through three. In chapter two, I will present a historical narrative on Georgia. Being a 
student of area studies, I believe that understanding the general situation is vital to assess the 
context of which the two cases operate. Chapter Three will present the theoretical and 
methodological framework of the thesis.  
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The second part of the thesis will be devoted to presenting and analysing the data found. 
Chapter Four will look at the energy policy and land acquisition. Chapter Five will examine at 
the environmental and social issues related to the question of this thesis. Summing up in 
Chapter Six, the theoretical framework will be re-applied to shed light on the findings.  
9 
 
2 Chapter 2: Background 
This chapter will give a brief outline of the history of Georgia. Located between the east and 
the west, Georgia has always shared borders with larger and more powerful states, dating 
from the Persians and the Ottoman Empire to the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and 
today’s Russian Federation. This has affected the country’s history as well as its present 
situation. The present thesis will focus on the period between 2006 and 2013, with emphasis 
on the political and economic situation in the post-Rose Revolution period. However, before 
discussing the main features of present-day Georgia I will give a brief historical overview, as 
some elements from the past still affect the country today. 
2.1 The Soviet period in Georgia  
Georgia had a short-lived period of independence between 1918 and 1921 before it was 
occupied and became a part of the Soviet Union. Within the union, modern-day Georgia was 
first incorporated into the Transcaucasia SFSR along with Armenia and Azerbaijan. This 
republic was broken up in 1936, and the Georgian SSR was created and lasted until the fall of 
the Soviet Union (Kappeler 2001, 372). 
As Yuri Slezkine (1994, 415) put it, the soviet authorities created different national units and 
put them in separate rooms within the soviet “communal apartment”. The soviet authorities 
pursued two different goals at the same time: on the one hand they encouraged separate rooms 
for nations, while on the other hand they wished to boost the image of the unity of nations. 
The policy of encouraging nationhood was part of the so-called korenizatsiia (indigenisation) 
project, promoted in the 1920s. The aim was to spread communism and extend the popular 
political base among non-Russians (Pelkmans 2006, 9, 59). Thus, the soviet “landlords” 
strengthened and reinforced the division of nations, with the idea that the soviet republics 
would be national in form but not in content (Kappeler 2001, 376). Subsequently, ethnic 
categorisation and the establishment of ethno-territorial borders became essential in the Soviet 
Union. The division and administration of the Georgian SSR, containing two autonomous 
republics and an autonomous region, would have a critical impact on Georgia’s independence 
(Jones 2013, 25). 
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In the 1930s Moscow decided to focus on developing fully-formed states, rather than pursuing 
numerous national projects. Many of the minor ethnic groups lost their status and therefore 
also their privileges, although the Georgians were among those who had their own republic 
and administration, and consequently their efforts towards building their national culture were 
upheld and strengthened. However, the “Georgian room” was far from homogeneous, and in 
particular ethnic minorities such as the Abkhazians and the Ossetians were oppressed within 
the Georgian SSR (Slezkine 1994, 426–7). The Georgian SSR had its hardships; the Great 
Purge in the late 1930s hit Georgian society hard, despite the fact that Stalin was Georgian. In 
addition many Georgians fought in the Second World War, and many of them never came 
back (De Waal 2010, 85–86). 
An important issue in the late soviet period was a concern for the environment and natural 
resources. The most infamous case is the Chernobyl disaster in the Ukrainian SSR in 1986 but 
all across the Soviet Union environmental was receiving significant attention. Alongside 
issues of language and culture, environmental concerns contributed to both mobilising and 
legitimising ethno-political movements in the USSR (Tishkov 1997, 69–70, 77–78). It was 
the central authorities that made decisions regarding exploitation of natural resources, and 
sometimes these decisions were imposed regardless of local protest. In Georgia, there was a 
great protest against the proposed construction of the Khudoni dam in the Svaneti region in 
1979 (Jones 2013, 29). When the central authorities decided to build the dam, protest from the 
local population and the new national movement, coinciding with the imminent dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, eventually halted the construction in 1989
2
 (GA 2007, 9). 
Georgia was considered one of the wealthiest republics in the Soviet Union, and it became a 
popular tourist destination known for its good food and wine (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012, 17). 
In the soviet period Georgia developed a busy grey economy, with extensive Mafia-like 
networks and pervasive corruption at all levels of society (Cheterian 2008, 157). Despite this, 
life in soviet Georgia was considered to be reasonably good. Georgians assumed that their 
country would prosper with independence as they had industry and produced good food and 
wine, but in fact independence turned out to be a struggle.  
                                                 
2
 In the mid-2000 the Saakashvili government decided to resume the construction of the Khudoni dam. It is one 
of the most controversial constructions in Georgia due to environmental concerns and the question of 
resettlement of local population. 
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2.2 A fragile beginning  
Georgia experienced a severe recession after the fall of the Soviet Union. The recession had 
several causes. Not only did Georgia lose the money transfers it used to receive from the 
central authorities in Moscow, but it also lost access to an external market, which had 
collapsed when the Soviet Union fell. In addition, regional conflicts and unrest during the 
1990s affected the country’s political and economic transition (Jones 2013, 142). Like the rest 
of the newly independent countries, Georgia faced a double transition. First, as it evolved 
from a republic within the USSR to an independent state, Georgia needed to create a new 
institutional framework including a national, democratically-elected parliament. Second, 
Georgia went from a planned economy to a market-based economy. This was not an easy 
process, and it was handled differently across the newly independent states of the former 
Soviet Union (Åslund 2007, 305–307).  
The first president of the newly independent Georgia, the fiery nationalist Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, had a limited opportunity to introduce reforms because of the conflicts and 
chaos in the aftermath of independence. The conflict in South Ossetia between 1988 and 1992 
and the military coup d’état that ousted Gamsakhurdia in December 1991 destroyed any 
serious efforts to stabilise the country. The Tbilisi-based government struggled to control the 
capital, let alone the country, and Gamsakhurdia was president for less than a year. While still 
formally in office, he died under mysterious circumstances in the Samegrelo region in 
December 1993 (Cheterian 2008, 204). The former soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard 
Shevardnadze returned to Tbilisi to become head of state in 1993. He was asked to lead a 
provisional government without any referendum or election, and it was not until 1995 that he 
was formally elected President of Georgia (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 152). 
Nicknamed “the white fox”, Shevardnadze was a skilful politician but he was hardly a 
reformer or a democrat. Under Shevardnadze several problems from the soviet period 
persisted. In addition to the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the central 
government had little control over Mingrelia, Samtskhe-Javakheti, Svaneti and Ajara. In 
addition, extensive corruption, strong organised criminal networks and the post-soviet 
challenges of high unemployment and rising poverty led to the government’s decreasing 
popularity (Cheterian 2008, 210). Due to the absence of territorial unity and a functioning 
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central power and because of its strong regional divisions, Georgia was named a “quasi-state” 
or a “failed state” in the 1990s (Jones 2013, 141). 
When considering Shevardnadze’s performance as president it is important to bear in mind 
that his starting point was a state falling to pieces due to internal conflicts. He saved Georgia 
from total collapse during the period between 1992 and 1993, but the state remained weak 
under his presidency (Cheterian 2008, 211). Bunce and Wolchik argue that Shevardnadze 
made “the best of a bad situation” (2011, 153). Nevertheless, the Georgian population grew 
impatient, being eager to see real improvements, and started to look for other political 
options. The already displeased population therefore reacted strongly to the fraudulent 
parliamentary election in November 2003 (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 156). 
2.3 The Rose Revolution 
Disputes over the parliamentary election sparked widespread protests in Tbilisi in November 
2003. The Rose Revolution, as it became known, led to the forced resignation of President 
Shevardnadze. A drawback of the revolution was yet another failure of the democratic 
transfer of power, as there was no presidential election and Shevardnadze was constitutionally 
required to step down in 2005
3
 (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 149). Nevertheless, it swept a 
young and Western-educated politician into power and paved the way for comprehensive 
reforms (Jones 2013, 107). The new president, Mikheil
4
 Saakashvili, was educated in the 
United States, speaks fluent English and has a Dutch wife. Under the leadership of 
Saakashvili, the country has undergone important changes. The Saakashvili government 
wanted Georgia to become a liberal democracy with a liberal economy. It wanted to improve 
the situation for democracy, fight corruption, balance the national budget and increase 
economic growth. Amongst the very ambitious goals of the new government was attracting 
FDI to Georgia to facilitate rapid economic development (ibid.).  
The new government led a remarkably successful fight against the pervasive corruption that 
has crippled Georgian leaders in both the soviet and post-soviet era (Jones 2013, 107). 
                                                 
3
 Georgian leaders tend to assume power in an un-constitutional matter. An exception is possibly Noe Jordania in 
1919 (Jones 2013, 337). 
4
 Non-Georgian sources sometimes spell the president’s name via the Russian version, Mikhail. In Georgia, the 
president is often referred to just as Misha. 
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According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, Georgia has climbed 
in the rankings from 124
th
 out of 174 counties in 2003 to 51
st
 in 2012 (Transparency.org 
2003). This stands in contrast to neighbouring post-soviet countries that rank much lower; 
Armenia ranks at 105, Russia is at 133 and Azerbaijan is down at 139 in the 2012 index 
(transparency.org). Noteworthy, the Georgian population and companies operating in Georgia 
do not consider corruption a significant challenge anymore (Gursoy 2008, 24). Corruption has 
been one of the most problematic legacies of the Soviet Union, and therefore, Georgia’s fight 
against corruption represents a significant improvement.  
President Saakashvili’s rhetoric might be interpreted as left-wing in the Western media, even 
though his government has adopted some rather right-wing decisions, such as favouring big 
business over small businesses and employees (Jervalidze 2007, 5). The first Saakashvili 
government is considered the world’s youngest government at the time5, and effectively 
paved the way for a new generation with an understanding of the market economy. However, 
a drawback was that many in the administrative bureaucracy were accused of corruption and 
were fired without regard to the retention and usefulness of their knowledge (Jones 2013, 
166). Consequently, the bureaucracy dealt with corruption at the expense of expertise. The 
Georgian government has also been criticised for changing their ministers too frequently 
(Jervalidze 2007, 3).  
The changes that have come about since the revolution can easily be observed. For instance 
the new glass-plated police stations symbolise modernity and transparency, and international 
luxury hotels in Tbilisi and Batumi represents economic growth (Jones 2013, 144). In 
addition, the frequent energy crises under President Shevardnadze are now gone. These 
positive aspects of the reforms after the Rose Revolution cannot be ignored, but it has been 
argued that these achievements have been made at the cost of reduction in civic and property 
rights (Jervalidze 2007, 10). Democracy is perhaps the area that has seen the least progress 
under President Saakashvili. According to the Freedom in the World report, Georgia ranks as 
“partly free” with a score of 46, just as it did under Shevadnadze in 2003 (Cheterian 2013, 86, 
106). Arguably, the willingness of the people to take to the streets to show discontent can be 
interpreted as a sign of strong civic consciousness. However, despite the ability to mobilise 
                                                 
5
 The Georgian defense minister was twenty-nine years and the foreign minister thirty-one years old at the time 
of the conflict with Russia in 2008 (de Waal 2010, 196). 
6
 7 is for most unfree, and 1 for most free countries. 
14 
 
and protest, as demonstrated in 2003, 2007 and 2012, Georgia’s civil society remains weak 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 323). Other democratic challenges that persist after the Rose 
Revolution includes that branches of power are not separated, the news media have been more 
constrained, the new elite holds a large share of the country’s wealth and the judicial system 
remains dependent and flawed (Jervalidze 2007, 13). With the latter it is worth noting that 
many foreign companies trust the courts when they are in conflict with the private sector, but 
not when they have unsolved issues with the government (Gursoy 2008, 21).  
2.4 The Autonomous Republic of Ajara 
There were three secessionist regions in Georgia after independence. I will not go into detail 
about Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but I will give a short historical background and describe 
the central features of Ajara because this thesis looks at two greenfield hydropower projects 
that are both located in Ajara, and therefore it is necessary to clarify the status of this 
autonomous republic.  
Ajara was declared an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on 16 July 1921. The region 
had been ceded from the Ottoman Empire to the Russian Empire, but as a compromise Ajara 
was granted autonomy for its Sunni Muslims (Pelkmans 2006, 104). In the Soviet Union the 
Muslim Ajarians were not counted as a distinct ethnic group because they spoke Georgian. 
Moscow considered language to be a legitimate indicator for ethnicity, but religion was not 
(Mouritzen and Wivel 2012, 15). The authorities imposed strict control since the mountainous 
regions border Turkey. The republic remained a backwater of the Georgian SSR, with the 
possible exception of Batumi city, which was a popular tourist destination (Pelkmans 2006, 
6–8, 174). 
In 1991 President Gamsakhurdia appointed Aslan Abashidze to be the head of Ajara’s 
Supreme Council. Gamsakhurdia’s initial plan was to cancel the region’s autonomous status, 
but when he eventually tried to push this through, Abashidze had already consolidated his 
power and was able to successfully mobilise against the president. As Gamsakhurdia faced 
more pressing issues elsewhere in Georgia, Ajara’s autonomy was strengthened by Abashidze 
as he took advantage of the republic’s strategic location, its seaports and cross-border trade 
(De Waal 2010, 146). The region’s main city, Batumi, is considered to be a strategically 
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important asset since most of the country’s cargo traffic runs through the city. Ajara did not 
pay taxes to the central government during the Abashidze period (Cheterian 2008, 186). 
However, the Rose Revolution put the status of Ajara on Tbilisi’s agenda once more.  
Though the events in Tbilisi in late 2003 were not directed towards the self-governing and 
secessionist republics, reintegration soon became an important issue (Cheterian 2008, 329). 
Abashidze refused to cooperate with the new central government, and the relationship 
between Batumi and Tbilisi worsened. The protests in and outside Ajara increased, and 
Abashidze eventually left the republic early May 2004. Following Abashidze’s exit the new 
government attempted to weaken the republic’s autonomy. For example, Levan 
Varshalomidze, a close ally of president Saakashvili, was appointed Ajara’s new prime 
minister, and by empowering the president with the right to appoint the head of the republic, 
in effect Ajara became politically closer to Tbilisi. In addition, the president holds the power 
to dismiss the republic’s legislature, which ensures that the central government retains some 
control over Ajara (Jones 2013, 316). Another example of the reintegration of Ajara was the 
decision to move the Constitutional Court from the capital to Batumi in 2007 (constcourt.ge). 
Ajara still enjoys an autonomous republic status, but its power vis-à-vis central government 
has been questioned, since many issues are in reality decided from Tbilisi. Although Ajara 
can decide on some aspects of its fiscal policy, Tbilisi retains power in strategic areas, such as 
security and defence (Jones 2013, 316). Ajara has the same environmental and property laws 
as the rest of Georgia, and there are no special laws in Ajara that make greenfield hydropower 
projects different compared to other regions of Georgia. With this in mind, this thesis will not 
make a strong distinction between the Ajarian government and central government. The 
ministries in Tbilisi decide all the main policies and issue permits and licenses regarding the 
construction of hydropower plants. Currently, Ajara struggles with the same challenges as the 
rest of Georgia, such as a high unemployment rate and a lack of development outside the 
major cities (Cheterian 2013, 113). 
2.5 Economic situation 
The economic situation in Georgia in the year of the Rose Revolution is the subject of some 
debate. Some argue that the economy “was sinking”, emphasising the country’s vast trade 
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deficit and inadequate tax collection (Jones 2013, 191–192). The economist Vladimir Papava, 
who was the former minister of economy from 1994 to 2000, argues that contrary to common 
perceptions the year 2003 was relatively good (Papava 2010, 159). This was the year in which 
the BTC
7
 pipeline deal was signed, the GDP growth rate reached 11.1 % and inflation was 
relatively moderate. Yet, one of the major issues since independence remained, namely 
difficulties with collecting taxes from both the population and companies. When the 
collection of budgeted revenue failed, the country could not pay out salaries and pensions on 
time (Jones 2013, 192). In 2003, the estimated share of the untaxed economy in the country’s 
GDP reached 65-70% (Papava 2005, 158). Georgia still has an uphill struggle to collect 
sufficient tax revenue.  
In addition to some failures on the state’s behalf, well-meaning advice from international 
financing institutions was not always suited for the Georgian reality, as for instance when the 
IMF suggested a new Georgian tax code in the 1990s (Papava 2005, 161). The IMF experts 
drafted advice on the premise that the national borders were under full control with a well-
functioning customs authority, an assumption which did not reflect the actual situation in 
Georgia with two secessionist republics and highly active channels for smuggling goods from 
Russia and Turkey (Cheterian 2008, 186). Bringing in enough revenue for the treasury is a 
vital task. Later on, I will discuss whether hydropower production can contribute to 
improving revenue and income. 
For the general population, the economic situation has made little improvement since the 
Rose Revolution. The high level of poverty is linked to the large percent of subsistence 
farmers and the internally displaced persons from the conflicts after independence. According 
to the Gini coefficient that measures inequality, Georgia in 2008 had a score of 0.404
8
, which 
is the highest rating of the former Soviet states (Jones 2013, 308, 120). The Saakashvili 
government has not been able to deal with the challenge of large and long-term 
unemployment patterns, poverty or the inequality.  
                                                 
7
 BTC: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, transferring oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean coast of 
Turkey. 
8
 With zero representing full equality, and one being the highest level of inequality. The Georgian score indicate 
a high inequality. 
17 
 
2.6 Foreign policy  
Another important change after the Rose Revolution was the intensified relationship with the 
EU and the United States and the worsening of relations with Russia. Russia was a significant 
importer of Georgian goods and is a key player in the question of the status of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (De Waal 2010, 197–199). While Shevardnadze’s rule was characterised by a 
careful balancing act between Moscow and the West, Saakashvili’s premiership got off on the 
wrong foot with the Russians (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 105). Moscow was sceptical of the 
events unfolding under the Rose Revolution and feared it would lose its influence in the 
country (Lambroschini 2004). In early 2006 two pipelines transporting gas from Russia were 
blown up, leaving parts of Georgia without gas to heat their houses. To this day it is unknown 
who was behind the attacks, but the incidents nevertheless made Georgia recognise the need 
to stop relying on Russia for all its energy import (Müller-Kraenner 2008, 22–23). 
2006 was also the year when the BTC pipeline started transporting oil from Azerbaijan via 
Georgia to Europe. The pipeline was politically initiated by the United States, though most of 
the investments came from Europe. With the BTC pipeline, Russia lost much of its energy 
influence over the region (Müller-Kraenner 2008, 93). Later the same year Russian banned 
imports of Georgian wine, based on dubious health concerns (De Waal 2010, 13). Other 
incidents followed which further damaged the relationship between Russian and Georgia, for 
instance, a number of illegal Georgian immigrants were suddenly expelled from Russia (Jones 
2013, 248–250). Finally, the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 led to the two countries severing 
diplomatic relations, and subsequently Georgia declared that it would to leave the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (rferl.org). The relationship with Russia is closely 
connected to Georgia’s national security, and has a potential affect the decision of investors to 
invest in Georgia. 
The EU has become more active in Georgia since 2004, even though the prospect of accession 
remains ambiguous (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012, 147). The EU has given a great deal of 
support for state building through different organisations. Moreover, the United States has 
also been involved in democratic development both before and after the revolution (Bunce 





, although this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. At present the 
Georgian government has settled for political agreements and convergence with EU standards 
and regulations. Since 2006 Georgia has been a member of the EU’s European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a fact which has affected several policy decisions, such as 
security issues and market reform (Mouritzen and Wivel 2012, 156). Another foreign goal is 
NATO membership; something which Russia strongly opposes (Jones 2013, 251). Also worth 
mentioning is Georgia’s relationship with neighbouring Turkey, since Georgia and Turkey 
have expanded their political and economic collaboration since the Rose Revolution.  
2.7 Summary 
The aim of this chapter has been to describe the political and economic situation in Georgia, 
since the nation’s political orientation, economic situation and civil society are important 
aspects that have an impact on the hydropower sector’s development. The chapter has 
described the current state of the country and pointed out some of the persistent challenges, 
such as collecting revenue, a weak civil society and a high unemployment rate. Not long ago 
the country was in chaos and decline, but Georgia has clearly come a long way in a short 
time. In addition, the successful reintegration of Ajara should be noted. To understand the role 
of FDI in Georgia we need to understand the post-soviet transition as well as the current 
political and economic situation. 
                                                 
9
 Devotion to the EU can be seen outside the Parliament in Tbilisi. Next to the Georgian flag, flies the EU’s flag. 
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3 Methodical and theoretical 
framework  
This chapter will present the methodical and theoretical framework of the thesis. First I will 
describe the method of the research, before moving on to examine the theoretical framework 
and tools that will be used throughout the thesis. 
3.1 Method 
This chapter describes the research method I have chosen as well as the procedure for data 
collection. This thesis is a case study of two greenfield hydropower plants in Georgia. The 
method used in this thesis raise some challenges, which are discussed below.  
3.1.1 Qualitative methods  
There are multiple definitions of qualitative methods. In this thesis I will employ Ragin and 
Amoroso’s classification of a qualitative method as a “basic strategy of social research that 
usually involves in-depth examination of a relatively small number of cases” (2011, 230). I 
have chosen to use a qualitative research approach because the aim of the thesis is to 
understand the context and obtain a deeper knowledge of greenfield FDI in the Georgian 
hydropower sector. I want to look beyond a purely quantitative understanding of Georgia’s 
hydropower development. As such, a qualitative approach was an obvious choice. The aim of 
the thesis is not to prove a “grand theory”, but rather to gain an in-depth understanding and 
develop ideas based on the empirical findings (Ragin and Amoroso 2011, 113).  
As I gathered information, I realised that there was limited material available that projected 
how FDI in the greenfield hydropower sector would affect Georgia. Apart from general 
statements, the government has no public plan for how Georgia will profit from the greenfield 
investment in the electricity sector. Most of the literature is written with potential investors in 
mind, including reports from organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF and the USAID. 
The reports are written for and from an investor’s point of view, and therefore they do not 
always consider the consequences for the country as such. In addition, the memorandums 
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between the government and the investing foreign companies are confidential. Consequently, 
little concrete information can be retrieved from such documents. As a result, I recognised 
that it would be useful to interview different stakeholders in order to obtain information that 
would enable me to answer the questions in the thesis. The stakeholders in this context are the 
Georgians who are affected by the greenfield development, ranging from the authorities and 
the private hydropower companies to the NGOs and members of the local population who are 
directly affected.  
3.1.2 Case studies 
In the early stages of the research it became evident that a case study methodology would be 
suitable for the thesis. Yin writes that “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear” (Yin 2009, 18). Thus, by looking 
at the context and circumstances related to the two cases studied, I seek to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the issues discussed in this thesis. 
More importantly, the case study is a good option when using multiple data sources (Yin 
2009, 114), which is useful since this thesis draws upon a range of different empirical data. 
The data sources utilised include interviews, news media, government resolutions and various 
reports from local and international NGOs. During the analysis I will draw on different data 
sources and see if there are corroborating results. If so, this might strengthen the findings (Yin 
2009, 116). The combination of multiple sources of data is called triangulation, which means 
“to collect converging evidence from different sources” (Yin 2011, 79). Such a technique 
contributes to a broader understanding of the data, and can make the analysis more robust 
(Yin 2012, 13). Triangulation of data might enhance the validity of the research since multiple 
sources of evidence provide support for the existence of the same phenomenon (Yin 2009, 
116).  
I wanted to avoid pinning all the resources on one single case, which can be a weakness of 
single-case studies (Yin 2009, 61). Examining two cases will reduce the risk of overlooking 
or overestimating certain issues. Arguably, more cases could have been added to the analysis 
in the thesis, but I believe that the two cases chosen provided enough information about the 
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subject under investigation. In addition, the thesis does not seek to generalise the results in a 
broader sense. The findings reported in this thesis might not be well suited for generalisation; 
rather, the aim is to contribute to the understanding of the role of FDI in greenfield 
hydropower in the particular context of the two cases. The findings can therefore offer 
insights into the specific context under investigation. 
3.1.3 Positionality 
In the spring of 2012, I undertook an internship with the AGL project in Batumi. The 
internship lasted for approximately five months and was part of my master’s degree. Through 
the internship I gained useful insights into the political and economic situation in Georgia in 
general, and the hydropower sector in particular. As the case study methodology usually 
requires previous knowledge (Yin 2009, 72), it was an advantage to have worked in the AGL 
project, thus gaining first-hand experience in the country and the hydropower sector. This 
made my research trip to Georgia easier, while also enabling me to ask the stakeholders better 
and more specific questions. Also, I believe that the internship gave me better access to the 
stakeholders I wanted to contact. That said, Georgia after the Rose Revolution is considered 
to be one of the most open post-soviet societies, making it easier to gain access to some 
stakeholders (Cheterian 2013, 91). This openness is reflected in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, where Georgia was one of the most corrupt countries in 2003 
but has now climbed to a respectable 51st place (transparency.org). Although my previous 
experience was certainly an advantage, it is nevertheless true that even with such experience it 
would have been more challenging to conduct similar a research in neighbouring Russia or 
Azerbaijan, for instance, which are far less open countries than Georgia.  
However, while the stay provided me with knowledge about the hydropower sector in 
Georgia, it also gave me a certain bias. It is undoubtedly true that there is no such thing as 
absolute objectivity when writing a qualitative thesis, but this is not necessarily a goal of such 
studies. Still, it is worth mentioning that case studies might be more prone to the problem of 
bias, because they usually demand previous knowledge of the issue being studied. As some 
bias is inescapable, it is necessary to be aware of them and to remain open to contrary 
empirical findings (Yin 2009, 74). My close relationship with the AGL project might have 
given me a certain bias, and therefore I want to be open about that in principle I am in favour 
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of hydropower plants, and in general, I have a positive opinion about both the project cases, 
although I recognise that hydropower construction might have social and environmental 
drawbacks. By being open about my views, I hope that the reader will detect whether there is 
any bias in my research (Yin 2011, 39). 
3.1.4 The interviews 
The analysis is based on interviews conducted with different stakeholders within the 
hydropower sector in November 2012. The thesis puts greenfield FDI in a broad political and 
economic context, but the extensive scope of the related issues means I cannot go into detail 
about every aspect of the data. I found interviews to be the most useful approach in order to 
understand what the stakeholders regard as the main issues. 
I conducted eighteen interviews, three in Batumi and the rest in Tbilisi. The country has 
become centralised after the Rose Revolution, meaning that the capital is the place to get hold 
of important stakeholders, although Batumi and Ajara are where the hydropower construction 
is taking place. Ajara has legal status as an autonomous republic, but this makes little political 
and legal difference (see the discussion in the previous chapter). In Batumi I mainly gathered 
specific information on the cases, whereas in Tbilisi I got both general background 
information and specifics related to the cases. 
I conducted the interviews in a semi-structured way; that is, I had a set of questions but I kept 
the interviews open so the interviewees could express themselves more freely. Semi-
structured interviews allow flexibility and are open to the possibility that the informant might 
bring up points or topics that otherwise could be missed (Yin 2011, 135). Hence, this 
interview format is ideal for qualitative explorations of previously unexplored subjects.  
I took notes during the interviews and wrote them up on the same day that the interviews were 
conducted, in order to minimise the risk that I would forget something vital. Two interviews 
were carried out with the help of a translator and the rest were conducted in English. I could 
have done the interviews in Russian, but a translator was provided and I felt it would have 
been impolite to turn them down. The translators had a good knowledge of English, but 
nevertheless there is always a risk that some nuances might get lost in translation. However, 
speaking and writing Russian helped with getting around and with making contact with 
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people, and Georgian platitudes helped as well. All but one interview were done in the offices 
of the interviewee, and they lasted between thirty and ninety minutes. 
As I had some previous knowledge of the hydropower sector, I had an idea of who it would 
be useful to interview and I started with contacting those people. Then I used snowball 
sampling, asking my informants if they had any suggestions for stakeholders I should talk to. 
I tried to aim for a balance between different kinds of stakeholders. Also, by interviewing a 
range of stakeholders I was trying to detect bias and hidden interest of the interviewees. 
The stakeholders had different views on the hydropower sector. I had one or more interviews 
with participants from the following areas: a private hydro company (Adjaristsqali LLC), a 
private scientific research firm (Gamma Consulting), two local environmental NGOs (Green 
Alternative and the Greens Movement of Georgia), a regional environmental NGO (Caucasus 
Environmental NGO Network), an international NGO (Transparency International Georgia
10
), 
an employee at the Energy Efficiency Centre, an associate professor at Tbilisi State 
University, an independent energy expert, a state investment agency (Invest in Batumi), an 
employee at a centre promoting the Aarhus Convention (the Aarhus Centre Georgia
11
), a 
former vice minister at the Ministry of Environment Protection, a civil servant from the 
Ministry of Environment Protection, two civil servants at the Ministry of Energy and one 
interviewee who wished to remain anonymous. Additionally, I had a telephone interview with 
the PR manager at the Ajar project in March 2013. For all the participants I will refer to their 
position and workplace, but I will not use their names since I assumed that the stakeholders 
answered according to the policies of their company, ministry or organisation. Their 
statements, unless otherwise noted, are therefore not to be interpreted as personal opinions, 
but rather as an expression of the stakeholder organisation’s view. All the interviewees were 
Georgians. In addition to the interviews, I also attended a public meeting with the Ministry of 
Environment Protection, a presentation on tariffs by the Norwegian hydropower economist 
Einar Hope, in which the tariffs in Georgia were discussed, and I also talked to several 
expatriates living in Georgia who working for different international companies and NGOs.  
                                                 
10 
I meet with Transparency International Georgia three times, including meeting with one property expert, a 
lawyer on the more general features, and a meeting at the Batumi office.
 
11
 The Aarhus Centre was established to facilitate the implementation of the Aarhus Convention in Georgia, and 
works to implement the three pillars of the convention;  “promote access to environmental information, public 
participation in environmental decision-making and access to justice” (aarhus.ge). 
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A group of stakeholders I did not interview during my research trip to Georgia was the 
affected population. In the spring of 2012, however, I travelled to the areas affected, and I 
spoke with the local population, which provided me with some idea of the issues that concern 
them. The affected population’s reflections are of course interesting and relevant, since they 
are the ones who are primarily affected by the developments. For various reasons I did not 
formally interview the affected population, and to mitigate this weakness I will address the 
concerns of the affected population by other means. It has been very useful to utilise the 
records of public meetings from several different hydropower projects, and the data from both 
cases contain thorough reports from public meetings with the affected population. These 
documents are publicly available and they demonstrate the questions and concerns of the 
people present at the meetings. In addition, I have also utilised accounts from NGOs, although 
I am aware that the NGOs might have their own agendas. A recurring problem seems to be 
that the affected population tends to be inadequately informed about the project status and the 
consequences of the hydropower plant. This leads to speculation and scepticism among the 
population (GA 2012a, 14). Additionally, the construction of the hydropower plants has just 
begun, and the consequences of the schemes are not yet completely evident. Thus, the 
analysis is based on the plans and actions of the companies and the Georgian authorities up to 
2013, and less emphasis is placed on what the affected people feel they have gained so far. 
3.1.5 Other factors 
The interviews were done a month after a parliamentary election in Georgia, an election 
which was won by the opposition. During that time the ministers and some of the government 
officials had been replaced, so when choosing interviewees at the ministries it was vital to 
make sure that the participants had been in their posts during the years relevant to this thesis 
(2006 to 2013). The only interviewee that requested to remain anonymous said that someone 
might call her the day after the interview and offer her a government position. Although there 
had been no post-election unrest, I felt that there was nevertheless a sense of tension. There 
was also uncertainty concerning the new parliament’s position on hydropower. Some of those 
I interviewed seemed more concerned with guessing what would happen next than reflecting 
on the recent past. 
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Regarding the names of places, I will use the Georgian official English names, reflecting how 
Georgian authorities spell place names in official documents and web pages. Therefore, I will 
use Ajara and Abkhazia rather Adjaria and Abkaz. Many cities and rivers mentioned in this 
thesis have Georgian, Turkish and Russian equivalents. As the thesis does not seek to explore 
the relationships between the neighbouring countries, I do not consider it problematic to use 
the Georgian versions. Some Georgian scholars spell their names differently in English. In 
such cases I have used the name that occurred most frequently when searching online. This 
may not always correspond to the correct way of transcribing from Georgian to English, but it 
makes the research easier to track, which is good for the validity of the study. 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
In this section I will identify the broad theoretical approach that will be used in the thesis. The 
section will start with a discussion of the post-soviet theory, followed by an examination of 
the concepts of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. The aim is to give a 
background to the ideas that have influenced Georgia’s policy path after independence, and 
especially since the Rose Revolution. In addition, I will use the World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business Index and the OLI paradigm (see page 35–37 for a description of OLI) as analytic 
tools to help answer the research question.  
3.2.1 Post –soviet theory 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Soviet/Russian experts had a temporary setback in their 
academic discourse since they had failed to foresee the collapse. The new situation also 
opened for new research input, and several non-regional experts jumped in to fill this demand 
(Engerman 2009, 337). Economists, bankers and financiers gained influence at the expense of 
historians and political scientists (Wedel 1998, 4). The former group primarily consisted of 
economists such as the Harvard-based Jeffrey Sachs. These scholars had little expertise in the 
post-soviet field; instead they based their advice and recommendations on economic 
experiences from Latin America and Southeast Asia (Åslund 2007, 30). 
The issue at stake was how the post-soviet states would catch-up economically and politically 
with Europe and the United States, and the pace of reform was at the very centre of the 
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debate. There were two camps engaged in discussing this question: some supported the 
introduction of rapid reforms, while others wanted a more gradual approach. The supporters 
of rapid reform can themselves be divided into three groups (Åslund 2007, 31). First, there 
were international financial institutions and some Western governments. This group primarily 
consisted of the IMF, the World Bank and the government of the United States, and they 
provided aid in the form of financial loans (Wedel 1998, 25). Second, there were the leading 
Western economists, for example Jeffrey Sachs, David Lipton, and Lawrence Summers. 
These economists were primarily Americans from top universities (Åslund 2007, 31). Several 
of them acted as advisors to the government, providing technical assistance and financial 
advice. Third, there was an often overlooked group of Eastern experts, such as the Czech 
Republic’s Vaclav Klaus and Poland’s Leszek Balcerowicz. These politicians showed that 
ideas about radical reform also came from countries in transition, rather than only imposed by 
Western-based institutions and experts (Bandelj 2008, 64). Those in opposition to radical 
reform, the so-called gradualists, constituted a group whose ideas were less clearly defined. 
Their main argument was nevertheless that a rapid transition would be socially costly and 
trigger an initial recession. For them, the gradual and successful economic reform of China 
was a source of inspiration (Åslund 2007, 37). 
Janine Wedel, an anthropologist who followed the post-soviet transition, writes that the 
debate about rapid versus gradual reform occurred mostly in academic circles, but Western 
financial agencies largely supported the former approach (1998, 21). Several of the newly 
independent states chose a form of radical reform, often referred to in this context as “shock 
therapy”. The interpretation of the political platform of shock therapy is controversial. Some 
observers say that shock therapy was solely the recommendation of international institutions 
and Western governments, while others argue that it might have been influenced by the 
recommendations of the aforementioned group, but the implementing countries took it a step 
further (Robinson 2013, 24). Nonetheless, shock therapy promised to tackle economic 
transformation without first building up new institutions to implement the reforms (Robinson 
2013, 26). 
In his book entitled Understanding Post-Communist Transformation, Rose writes that 
ignoring the past can easily lead to a misunderstanding of the present (2009, 9). He notes that 
at the start of the transition period there was little talk about the suitability of post-soviet 
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societies for embarking on a capitalist path. The legacy of the soviet past was ignored in 
favour of the shock therapy approach to creating a market economy (ibid., 47). The 
recommendations given were in general based on abstract models that often avoided facts 
which did not match the prescribed model (ibid., 70). Most of the recommendations were 
based on neoliberal economic theory, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
The transition reforms did not solve all the problems, and they also created new economic 
challenges, such as hyperinflation and a skyrocketing unemployment rate (Åslund 2007, 47). 
The rapid reforms proved both politically and economically difficult. Politically, the 
government in the 1990s lacked de facto power, largely due to neoliberal policies that aimed 
at less government influence. Economically, the soviet legacy was too entrenched, with 
reforms proving easier to implement in Eastern European countries that had been less marked 
by their soviet past (Robinson 2013, 29). While the break-up of the Soviet Union gave an 
extraordinary opportunity for comprehensive change, it did not provide a chance to start over 
with a clean slate. However, most of the advice on political and economic issues ignored the 
role of the communist legacy (Wedel 1998, 137). 
Georgia’s is perhaps one of the unhappiest post-soviet stories, since the country did not only 
suffer deep economic recession but also experienced a civil war. The conflict further damaged 
the economic situation as it delayed reforms and macro-economic stabilisation (Åslund 2007, 
26). Economic growth first started in 1995 after the end of the worst conflicts (Auty and De 
Soysa 2006, 97). Georgia opted for market reform in the early 1990s, but the reforms 
introduced were more or less a replica of what had been done in Russia, and as in the Russian 
case, they turned out to be unsuccessful (Papava 2005, 125). Jones writes that by 2003 
Georgia was considered to be one of the biggest reform failures out of all the former soviet 
cases (2013, 191). The reforms had not been able to control the country’s substantial trade 
deficit, and neither had the nation attracted any sizeable FDI. In addition, the state was still 
dependent on Russian energy imports. Some scholars, such as Åslund, argued that the failure 
was not due to misguided policy, but because of the lack of comprehensive reform or failures 
of implementation (Åslund 2007, 57). Stiglitz, on the other hand, argued that the reform 
failure was due to the economic approach itself (Stiglitz 1999, 3). The following section 




3.2.2 Neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus  
Neoliberalism is an economic theory that advocates strong property protection, a free market 
and free trade. It favours big business and promotes the downscaling of government (Harvey 
2005). In the late 1980s and early 1990s the theory was a popular economic framework. On 
the basis of experiences from Latin America in the 1980s, several macroeconomists, the IMF, 
the World Bank and the government of the United States all believed that macroeconomic 
stabilisation could best be achieved through radical and comprehensive reforms. Lawrence 
Summers, chief economist of the World Bank in 1991, illustrates the mood with the following 
quote: “spread the truth – the laws of economics are like the laws of engineering. One set of 
laws works everywhere” (Rose 2009, 2). The mood of the time among economists and 
politicians was that there was indeed a recipe for economic development that fitted all 
countries, no matter where they might be or what their background was. By following the 
neoliberal approach, all countries could experience economic growth.  
A term closely linked to neoliberalism is the Washington Consensus, which was coined by the 
economist John Williamson. This concept draws on neoclassical economic theory with an 
emphasis on free-market capitalism. The consensus is not an official policy or a position 
taken by any government or organisation. Rather, it is a set of policies agreed upon to an 
extent that it can be considered a consensus (Kolodko 2001, 312). The consensus consists of 
ten rather general points, such as “financial discipline is needed”, and promotes the virtues of 
a “liberal foreign policy” (Craig and Porter 2006, 58). 
The Washington Consensus is often used as a set of ideas, and thus a broad definition will be 
used in this thesis. According to Williamson, the Washington Consensus attempted to 
summarise policies that viewed the key to economic development as depending not on natural 
resources or human capital, but rather on the economic policies that the country pursued 
(Craig and Porter 2006, 58). It represented a paradigm developed at a time when most 
economists pursued a certain development strategy and many had little patience with nuances 
or doubts, believing that those who stood against reforms had the intention of preserving the 
status quo (Craig and Porter 2006, 58–59). The Washington Consensus and the reform 
policies inspired by the IMF and the World Bank relied, and still do to some extent, on the 
theory of the perfect market, but the post-soviet countries a long way from this ideal model 
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(Jomo and Fine 2006, 27). Financial lending from institutions such as the World Banks and 
the IMF is called “assistance”, but this term may be misleading, since the loans are 
commercial with tough repayment terms (Kolodko 2001, 307).  
In broad terms, the Washington Consensus holds the view that FDI accelerates economic 
growth. Barriers to FDI should be removed, and foreign and domestic companies should 
compete on equal terms (Kolodko 2001, 309). By presuming that multinational companies 
offer spillover effects in one form or another, the consensus values the quantity of FDI over 
its quality (Lall and Narula 2006, 5). Thus, it has a simplistic approach to the question of FDI. 
Concerning the greenfield hydropower plants, they can improve productivity and generate 
more exports, but that does not automatically mean that the industrial capacity or the 
competitiveness of the domestic sector will increase. Ultimately, the two latter factors are 
vital for sustainable growth (Lall and Narula 2006, 15).  
In the early 1990s the policy towards emerging markets, such as that in Georgia, was shaped 
by the Washington Consensus, which promoted financial and trade liberation as the key to 
growth and prosperity. The newly independent states were encouraged to liberalise as quickly 
as possible (Miller and Zhang 2001, 37). One of the conventional wisdoms of the Washington 
Consensus was a belief in free trade. This faith in free trade is still unquestioned (Jomo and 
Fine 2006, 47–48). I will not discuss the empirical literature on free trade but rather state that 
Georgia has followed a liberal free trade regime since the Rose Revolution. 
Several politicians and economists in the East were also influenced by these theories (Åslund 
2007, 31–32). The Washington Consensus is often named as the model for post-communist 
countries. While this might be true, some of these countries took reforms further than the 
consensus had anticipated, implementing more radical and specific programmes than the IMF 
and the World Bank had suggested (Stone 2002, 91). The IMF, the World Bank and the 
United States have been active in Georgia since independence, and have had an influence on 
the country’s policy path. Neoliberal policies were pursued both before and after the 
revolution in Georgia, but they accelerated after the Rose Revolution. 
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Some of the post-soviet states have the “four Asian tigers12” as a role model, and the 
economic achievements of the Southeast Asian countries have been credited to neoliberal 
policies (Gregory, Johnston et al. 2011, 38). It is true that the tigers’ growth has been fuelled 
by FDI to a large extend, nevertheless challenges have also arisen as a consequence of their 
economic development (economist.com). Therefore the tigers should not only be a model for 
economic growth but should also serve as a lesson on the importance of sustainable 
development. President Saakashvili has an ambition to "turn Georgia into a real flagship of 
the world liberal economic ideology" (civil.ge). It is apparent that the Saakashivili 
governments have followed a neoliberal influenced policy path (Schueth 2011, 64). 
Many have criticised the scope of the Washington Consensus, with one of the major 
criticisms being the lack of attention paid to institutions (Kolodko 2001, 310). Former Polish 
Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko argues that “a lack of institutional development turned 
out to be the missing element in transition policies based on the Washington consensus” 
(Kolodko 2001, 310). Rose (2009, 73) also argues that another mistake was the belief that 
national governments or international organisations like the IMF could be in real control of 
the transition process. According to Kolodko, transitions cannot be executed rapidly because 
introducing new laws, new institutions and new behaviours takes time (Kolodko 2001, 305). 
Craig and Porter (2006, 55) write that the Washington Consensus was “unattractive in name, 
unloved and often regretted in practice”. Both the IMF and the World Bank were heavily 
criticised because some of the countries that followed the reform programme showed poor 
economic performance (Jomo and Fine 2006, 29). The time for change had come. 
3.2.3 Beyond neoliberalism?  
The neoliberal approach has changed since the 1990s – or rather, and perhaps more 
importantly, the position of the World Bank and the IMF has changed. Instead of 
concentrating on structural adjustments, the focus has shifted to include poverty reduction and 
the promotion of good governance (Craig and Porter 2006, 1–3). When compared to most 
other international financing agencies, the World Bank has given more attention to social 
issues, and it has embraced a more “socially inclusive” version of the Washington Consensus. 
Also, since 1999 the World Bank has focused on a broader approach to development, 
                                                 
12
 Refers to the following developed economics with years of high growth rates; Singapore, Hong Kong, South 
Korea and Taiwan. 
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including social and environmental considerations, instead of only emphasising economic 
adjustments (Kolodko 2001, 317). The narrow focus on economic adjustments was no longer 
sufficient, and development had to include other aspects such as sustainability. This is often 
referred to as a post-Washington Consensus (Jomo and Fine 2006, 33).  
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz is associated with the post-Washington Consensus, which 
acknowledges that institutions, history and social conditions matter. Stiglitz has often 
criticised IMF policies; in particular, he has criticised the privatisation scheme in Russia (Hoff 
and Stiglitz 2002, 8–9). Stiglitz has argued for an “alternative paradigm, especially one 
relevant to the least developing country”, claiming that earlier development approaches had 
failed because they had viewed “development too narrowly” (Stiglitz in Jomo and Fine 2006, 
9). However, Stiglitz did not break with the Washington Consensus; rather, he made the 
approach more nuanced and added to the scope of its theoretical framework. Thus, the post-
Washington Consensus builds on the Washington Consensus in many respects (Jomo and 
Fine 2006, 15).  
Jomo and Fine (2006, 35–36) write that some of the World Bank’s current policies are proof 
that the Washington Consensus approach is still very much alive. With the Bank stating that 
there is little use in giving money to countries with “poor policy”, the conditions to receive 
financial aid are linked to the macroeconomics of the Washington Consensus – for example, 
low inflation and trade openness (Jomo and Fine 2006, 35–36). The main conclusion of the 
post-Washington Consensus is that institutions are vital to a country’s progression towards 
durable growth (Kolodko 2001, 323–325). More scholars have been looking at the role of 
institutions, and several of these people are from academic backgrounds other than economics 
(e.g. Wedel 1998; Rose 2009). 
The World Bank has aspired to take a leadership role in economic development around the 
world. As described above, the World Bank has changed its focus from stabilisation and 
structural adjustment under the Washington Consensus to a broader approach that includes 
environmental issues, institutional reform and “good governance” (Jomo and Fine 2006, 21). 
The World Bank has been active in post-soviet countries, including Georgia, where it has 
been instrumental in the initial transition period as well as involved in projects to increase 
standards of living (Kolodko 2001, 317). Through the IFC the World Bank has fiscally 
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supported one of the two cases in this thesis, and this has influenced the company’s policy, as 
will be discussed later. The next section contains an example of how the World Bank has 
influenced Georgia’s policy path. 
3.2.4 The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index 
The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index (EDBI) is a global indicator of economic 
competitiveness. It evaluates and ranks countries according to business regulations. The 
Doing Business project promotes a “one size fits all” policy (World Bank and IFC 2004), 
meaning that it is a model that can be applied to all countries across the world when it comes 
to competitiveness (Schueth 2011, 61). It is a part of the World Bank’s efforts to reduce 
poverty and promote development (Davis and Kruse 2007, 1098). The EDBI suggests that 
countries should aim for particular targets in order to enhance competitiveness, and the index 
collects quantitative data on 185 countries. The EDBI deals with a broad set of business 
activities: starting a business, hiring and firing employers, getting credit, closing a business, 
registering property, paying taxes, trading across borders and dealing with licenses (Davis and 
Kruse 2007, 1097). The ranking takes a top-down approach, where the World Bank sets the 
benchmarks and countries are ranked accordingly. It provides an external stimulus for 
Georgia’s policies because Georgian politicians are keen to climb the index, and consequently 
the World Bank exercises influence on the country’s policies.  
The Georgian government has used the EDBI as a strategic tool for deregulation and 
liberalisation. For Georgia, the country’s continuing climb up the rankings has been a 
“benchmark of its progress” (World Bank and IFC 2007, 7). In 2006 Georgia targeted a place 
in the top twenty-five countries, and it managed to reach this goal two years later. By 2013 
Georgia’s rank has climbed three places from the previous year and is now in the top ten, 
being ranked in ninth place out of 185 economies (doingbusiness.org 2013a). Interestingly, 
Georgia is categorised as a lower middle-income country, whereas the rest of the countries in 
the top ten are considered high income countries. The next lower middle-income country is 
Armenia ranked at 32 (ibid.).  
These achievements have improved Georgia’s reputation from “a failed state to a neoliberal 
vanguard state” (Schueth 2011, 62). Furthermore, the results have been quoted in 
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international commercials worldwide (georgia.gov.ge 2012). Thus, Georgia has utilised the 
potential of the country’s favourable EDBI ranking. By following the benchmarks set by the 
World Bank, Georgian politicians have relied on what the Bank’s economists believe works 
best to promote business (Fougner 2008, 321). At the very top of the ranking is Singapore, 
often mentioned by President Saakashvili as the ideal model for Georgia (civil.ge).  
A criticism against the index, similar to criticisms of neoliberalism, is that it does not consider 
factors in the countries’ social and economic contexts. In the EDBI the states are only judged 
in terms of their economies, with the prime attribute being competitiveness (Schueth 2011, 
57). Although the World Bank itself has become more orientated towards social issues, the 
index is an exception to this development. Fougner (2008, 303) warns against viewing 
competitive international rankings as neutral sources of information about the economic 
conditions of countries worldwide. Rather, they should be viewed as efforts to govern states 
in accordance with the neoliberal rationale. The policy is often favourable for private 
companies and capital flow (ibid., 304).  
Kolodko (2001, 315) writes that one of the failings of the early Washington Consensus was 
that there was little distinction between the tools and the goals. For instance, he argues that 
stabilisation and deregulation are nothing more than policy means, while sustainable growth 
and a better standard of living are the goals (ibid.). Though tools can in theory promote 
efficiency and competitiveness, it is not certain that this will occur in practice. Some of this 
might be true for the relationship between Georgia and the World Bank’s EDBI. It is a useful 
tool for following a certain reform path, but Georgian politicians seems to value it more than 
that. As such, the politicians might be at risk of making the same mistake as the reformers in 
the 1990s. Reaching the top ten should not be the end goal; the focus should be on the 
outcome of climbing the index, not merely climbing as high as possible. The ranking will be 
used throughout this thesis as a tool to demonstrate how reform-friendly Georgia is, and will 
also be used to illustrate that reforms are not always suitable or helpful for the Georgian 





3.2.5 The FDI debate 
This section will discuss the literature on FDI and economic development, as well as FDI’s 
impact on environmental issues. FDI has been at the core of mainstream economic theory for 
years, and international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank have had high 
hopes that FDI will trigger economic growth in emerging economies. Often these 
organisations have measured the level of success based on the total value of FDI inflow, 
placing emphasis on quantity (Neuhaus 2006, 39–40). A 2002 report from the OCED claims 
that “the overall benefits from FDI for developing countries are well documented” (Zarsky 
2005, 21). 
However, there is no evidence that FDI automatically leads to economic growth. In the book 
entitled International Investment for Sustainable Development the author argues that FDI is 
“no miracle drug” (Zarsky 2005, 15). Rather, it is shown empirically that the results of FDI in 
developing countries can turn out to have either a neutral or a positive impact on economic 
and environmental development. FDI might have the theoretical potential to generate growth, 
but the investment climate still has to conform to the “right” conditions. In short, these 
conditions include a certain level of human and technical development, functional institutions 
and some degree of the rule of law (Zarsky 2005, 26). Consequently, it is not simple to predict 
the likely outcome of FDI, since it is dependent on several factors (Moran, Graham et al. 
2005, 197). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that FDI’s effects on economic growth have 
ambiguous results, and there is little reliable evidence supporting the claims that FDI will 
necessarily accelerate economic growth (Charles 2000, 9; Moran, Graham et al. 2005, 197; 
UNCTAD 2009, 12–14). 
There are two main camps in the literature debating FDI and development. On the one hand, 
there are those who believe in free-market capitalism, who assert that FDI is indisputably 
beneficial and the more a country attracts the better. Neoliberalism recommends FDI, since it 
is considered to be “the highest form of external finance, ahead of portfolio investment, 
commercial loans, or overseas development aid” (Schueth 2011, 56). On the other hand, there 
are scholars critical of the notion of FDI-driven development, who point out that “one dollar 
of FDI is worth no more (and no less) than a dollar of any other kind of investment” (Dani 
Rodrik in Moran, Graham et al. 2005, 281). These authors are sceptical of the uncritical use of 
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FDI as a main tool for development (Inadomi 2010, 4). If the quest to attract FDI fails to 
deliver positive results, then the government should be worried about their responsibility and 
the cost of the FDI (Kolodko 2002, 4). The inflow of FDI should be seen as an addition to the 
flow of domestic capital, not as an alternative. Narula and Lall (2004, 15) write that the 
neoliberal approach to FDI gives few realistic answers. One of the critical questions is 
whether FDI promotes or lowers environmental standards (Dunning and Lundan 2008, 312).  
The relationship between FDI and environmental policy has gained increasing attention in the 
last two decades (see e.g. Zarsky 2005; Haas 2003; Viuales 2012). The notion that 
multinational companies seek “pollution havens”, as sometimes depicted by NGOs and the 
media, is in some cases true and in others not. Multinational companies sometimes attempt to 
transfer their high environmental standards throughout their subsidiaries (Zarsky 2005, 49). In 
some instances, the multinational companies have higher standards than their domestic 
counterparts. The improved environmental standards of international companies seem to be a 
result of wanting to be labelled as environmentally friendly businesses, rather than of 
regulatory pressure (Bulcke and Verbeke 2001, 5–6, 59). Shareholders might withdraw from 
projects with an appalling environmental management record, and therefore shareholders can 
influence the companies’ environmental policies. In addition, a good environmental policy 
might be part of a strategy for gaining and maintaining good relationships with the local 
population (Bulcke and Verbeke 2001, 60–61). The next section will look at a theory which 
tries to explain why some companies choose to invest in certain countries, namely the OLI 
paradigm. 
3.2.6 The OLI paradigm 
A scholar who has made a comprehensive contribution to the understanding of FDI is the 
British economist John H. Dunning, known for the OLI paradigm where he combined three 
theories of FDI. Dunning drew upon existing ideas on company theory, location theory and 
theories on industrial organisation and the market in order to create a better approach for 
understanding why some companies choose to engage in FDI activities (Maitland and 
Nicholas 2003). The paradigm identifies three categories of so-called advantages, namely 
ownership (O), location (L) and internalisation (I) (Dunning and Lundan 2008, 100). The 
three categories are sometimes also defined as why? (O), where? (L) and how? (I). It is a 
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framework for analysing international companies’ strategy and performance, without having 
to rely on FDI statistics (Eden 2003, 279). The OLI paradigm can also be used as a tool for 
analysing the host country’s determinants for attracting FDI (UNCTAD 2009, 5). 
The ownership (O) factor deals with the management advantages of the international 
company. It seeks to answer the question of why companies chose to become investors abroad 
and what advantages the companies must possess in order to succeed at this. Advantages for 
natural resource-seeking investors might include bargaining strengths and management 
expertise (Dunning and Lundan 2008, 104). Closely linked to the ownership advantages is the 
internalisation (I) advantage. Internalisation aims at explaining how the company utilises their 
ownership advantages in practice, and explaining why companies choose to own production 
rather than, for instance, producing in a joint venture (Eden 2003, 281). These two factors are 
internal and are directly related to the foreign investor company (Neuhaus 2006, 142).  
An external factor is the location (L), the “where” of the FDI, referring to the location 
advantages of the host country (Gugler and Dunning 2008). Such advantages might include 
government policies that affect FDI inflow, e.g. the removal of barriers to entering the market 
or to the import and export of products. Other factors may include tax benefits and low wages 
(Dunning and Lundan 2008, 104). Maitland and Nicholas believe that the O and I advantages 
are specific and useful analytic tools for understanding business decisions, while the L 
advantage is reduced to a list of contextual factors (2003, 49). Nevertheless, in this thesis the 
L component is relevant to Georgia as a host country trying to attract FDI, and it will be 
useful for explaining the reforms introduced by the government, as well as in examining why 
the case study companies have invested in that particular country. Location advantages in 
Georgia include an untapped hydropower potential, low wages and low taxes 
(investinbatumi.ge).  
The OLI paradigm indicates how ownership factors, combined with location and/or 
internalisation advantages, affect a company’s investment decisions. In order for a company 
to decide if it wants to be involved in FDI, it must achieve a net gain within one or more of 
these categories (Gugler and Dunning 2008). Dunning and Lundan (2008, 102) suggest that 
the three advantages are interdependent with one another, and that together the three aspects 
of the OLI paradigm interact to explain a company’s decision to invest in a specific location. 
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Dunning argues that the patterns of FDI are not regular, but differ according to the three 
elements (Dunning 1998). 
Eden believes the OLI paradigm should be viewed as “a way of looking at the phenomenon of 
multinational enterprises and their activities” (2003, 277). The paradigm operates mainly 
from the investing company’s perspective, but nevertheless it is useful to understand the 
preconditions of investment in a world where several countries are competing to attract FDI. 
The paradigm enables me to analyse the political features of the host country and the 
difference between that companies. In contrast to research on international business that tends 
to solely focus in the company, the OLI paradigm might say something about the country-
company relationship (Maitland and Nicholas 2003, 52). In this thesis the L component will 
be used as a tool to interpret FDI in Georgia’s hydropower sector, whereas the other two 
factors (O and I) can be used to explain the different outcomes of the two cases.  
3.3 Concluding remarks 
In the first part of this chapter I discussed the choice of method and argued that a qualitative 
approach is the most suitable for the aim of the thesis. The advantages and potential 
drawbacks of the methodological choice are mentioned, regarding the latter, I have tried to 
acknowledge and minimise any disadvantages of the qualitative method chosen, such as bias. 
The second part deals with the theoretical framework of this thesis. Neoliberal ideas have 
influenced many of the newly independent states, including Georgia. After the Rose 
Revolution the tendency towards neoliberal policy became clear, shown for instance in 
President Saakashvili emphasis that Singapore is a model for Georgia. As discussed above, 
the World Bank has had a considerable influence on the country’s policy path. It also has a 
direct influence on the company policy of one of the cases, namely the AGL project. I will 
use the EDBI as a tool for analyse the policy choices of the government. Though the ranking 
may say something about how reform-friendly a country is, it is not certain that an exclusive 
focus on the ranking is the most suitable approach. The OLI paradigm will help to analyse the 
findings in the thesis, explaining why the country has attracted FDI. 
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4 Energy policy and FDI in Georgia 
This chapter will discuss the characteristics of the hydropower sector in Georgia, in particular 
how Georgia made itself an attractive location for hydropower investment (the L in the OLI 
paradigm). These are factors that both are connected to the location advantage of Georgia, as 
well as cases where the investors can contribute to the development of the country. An 
important aspect of the FDI is land acquisition, which will be discussed in this chapter. Before 
I do that, I will first give some background on the energy policy impacting the FDI in the 
hydropower sector. 
4.1 Power policy  
In Georgia the history of hydropower goes back to before the 1900. In the soviet period 
several hydropower plants were constructed, and most of them were connected to the 
neighbouring republic’s power systems (menr.gov.ge 2011a). After the fall of the Soviet 
Union this system collapsed due to civil wars and a weak state structure, causing power 
deficiencies across the country. Like many of the country’s hydropower plant the massive 
Enguri hydropower plant
13
, which is at the core of national energy production with an annual 
generation of 3.1 to 3.3 Twh, fell into a state of disrepair during the 1990s and sorely needed 
rehabilitation (dfwatch.net). There are also a number of medium-sized and small hydropower 
plants in Georgia, some only operating seasonally because the water flow drops significantly 
during the summer months (Econ 2010a, 10).  
The year 2006 was interesting from an energy perspective. It began with the explosion of two 
gas pipelines from Russia, starkly illustrating the country’s dependence on Russia and its 
energy vulnerability in general (Müller-Kraenner 2008, 23). The incident led the government 
to vow to diversify its energy supply (eurasianet.org). An independent energy expert 
interviewed for this thesis pointed out that Georgia was in a “bad energy situation” in 2006. 
Of all the post-soviet countries, Georgia paid the highest price for Russian oil and gas 
(Gochitashvili 2012, 21). Georgia has no oil and gas reserves of its own, but it does possess 
an abundant hydropower potential, and the government began to plan how to utilise this 
                                                 
13
 The dam is located in Georgia, whereas the electricity station is situated in Abkhazian territory. Despite this, 
the Enguri hydropower plant has not been a source of conflict between Georgia and the secessionist republic. 
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domestic energy source. To reach this goal, a considerably higher level of investment in the 
energy sector was needed. 
Later in 2006 the resolution on the “Main Direction of State Policy in the Power Sector” was 
declared. The main goal of the resolution was the satisfaction of the domestic energy demands 
of both the industrial and domestic sectors, based on full utilisation of the energy resources 
existing in the country and the diversification of imported energy (menr.gov.ge 2011b). The 
resolution devotes substantial attention to the utilisation of domestic hydropower resources. It 
stated that Georgia would increase the capacity of local energy resources and that “effective 
development of rich hydro resources of the country shall become the main direction for 
development of the power sector in Georgia” (menr.gov.ge 2011c). The Ministry of Energy 
and Natural Resources reacted quickly to the resolution, and within weeks the ministry had 
announced the opening for bidding on thirty-two small and medium-sized hydropower plants 
(GA 2006, 50). Among the twenty-one newly established hydropower projects was the 
Chorokhi River plant, for which the Ajar project won a concession in 2007 to develop the 
hydro potential of the Georgian side of the river. 
The initial process in 2006 had limited success, but a new initiative accelerated the process; in 
2008 the government declared the “Renewable Energy 2008” programme that included a list 
of potential greenfield projects and rules for the construction of renewable energy sources 
(menr.gov.ge 2011d). The two cases in this thesis are a result of the energy policy 
implemented since 2006, in combination with the state policy goal adopted in 2008. They are 
both part of the country’s strategy of attracting FDI to greenfield energy projects. The 
government wanted to make Georgia an attractive place for greenfield hydropower 
investment, and creating an attractive environment for FDI is related to the location (L) 
advantage in the OLI paradigm. Some of the restructuring and reforms introduced since 2006 
are described below. 
4.1.1 State restructuring 
An obvious benefit of investing in Georgia is the abundant hydropower potential; there are 
about three hundred rivers that are possible sources for hydropower production, with an 
estimated annual potential capacity equivalent of 15000 MW (menr.gov.ge 2011e). However, 
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this is not enough as it must be financially viable as well as institutionally possible for 
investors to operate in the country. This section will look at some of the reforms the 
government introduced in order to attract FDI into the greenfield hydropower sector.  
In the past, it has generally been the government’s responsibility to develop, operate and own 
hydropower plants. However, this picture has changed since many states are finding it 
difficult to raise the funding needed for such projects, with the consequence that governments 
from all over the world have turned to the private sector for financing. With the increasing 
demand for investment in the power sector and a low-income budget, private investments can 
fill the gap (Inadomi 2010, 7). According to neoliberal thinking, private companies are more 
effective at completing and operating projects on time and within budget (ibid., 7). This 
matches the picture of the development of the electricity sector in Georgia. After the Rose 
Revolution the electricity sector was transformed, with the industry being deregulated and 
separated into generation, transmission and distribution companies (menr.gov.ge 2011c). 
Processes such as optimisation and simplification have been given a high priority. Through 
simplification the goal has been to shrink the bureaucratic procedures to a minimum, making 
it easier for foreign investors to obtain concessions and licenses (Econ 2010a, 4). The 
numbers of licensing and permits have been reduced by 84%, which has made the process less 
bureaucratic and less time consuming for the investor (Gursoy 2008, 20). The application 
procedures are relatively easy and straightforward (see menr.gov.ge 2011d). The deregulation 
of the electricity sector has also reduced the likelihood of public corruption, which is one of 
the positive sides of neoliberal policy (Jomo and Fine 2006, 200). Corruption can harm 
economic growth as it discourages investment; specifically, paying bribes can increase the 
cost of doing business (Auty 2003, 12). Hydropower plant construction is long-term and 
costly, and therefore the political and institutional risks should be minimised (Hope and 
Skjeret 2008, 3). 
Other developments in the electricity sector include the rehabilitation of existing hydropower 
plants, increased collection rates for distribution companies and a more stable electricity 
supply to most parts of the country (Econ 2010a, 4). The energy reforms noted above are in 
accordance with neoliberal ideas of deregulation, and are said to have followed the World 
Bank’s 1998 Europe and Central Asia energy sector strategy (Lampietti 2004, 7).  
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It is the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources that first and foremost regulates the sector. 
The ministry deals with energy policy, adopts strategies and puts forward recommendations, 
in addition to dealing with concessions and licensing to develop hydropower projects. Since 
2006 it has been committed to a “radical reform agenda” (Econ 2010a, 4). On the ministry’s 
web page, it is stated that “the maximum utilization of the abundant hydro-electricity is one of 
the priorities of the state. The main objective of the long-run energy policy is the attraction of 
foreign investment for the construction of the new power plants (menr.gov.ge 2011c). Thus, 
the aims of the ministry seem quite clear: the more utilisation of hydroelectric power and the 
more FDI, the better. The increased hydropower production might also facilitate the 
achievement of another energy goal, namely the long-term strategy of replacing all thermal 
generation with cleaner and cheaper hydropower (UNFCCC 2012, 20). If Georgia wants to 
meet its goal of energy independence and replace thermal energy, it must increase its 
hydropower capacity (Econ 2010a, 12).  
The head of the Investment Project Division at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
stated in the interview that the energy strategy since 2006 has been successful. He reported 
that the ministry had contracted over sixty hydropower projects. These figures include the 
construction of small, medium and large hydropower plants. About seventeen of the 
hydropower projects have already been launched, while others are under construction or in the 
planning stages (aarhus.ge). He also noted that the energy policy had been a quick success, 
which he believed was due to the government’s commitment to deal with the energy situation. 
More importantly, he said, the hydropower projects were very attractive for foreign investors 
because they were not exceedingly costly and there were no major environmental and social 
impacts compared with other such projects in the region. The independent energy expert 
agreed that the restructuring of the energy sector has been successful, despite some policy 
shortcomings, and that this should be recognised. The rehabilitation of existing hydropower 
plants, along with the construction of new production units and transnational oil and gas 
pipelines, has helped solve the country’s energy shortage (Gochitashvili 2012, 6). An advisor 
to the minister of energy and natural resources said that Western countries take twenty-four-
hour electricity for granted in the twenty-first century, but for Georgians it was only a few 
years ago that the electricity supply was unstable all over the country. Power cuts still occur, 
but these are due to technical shortcomings and not the lack of supply of electricity. The 
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anonymous interviewee stated that the new energy policy would perhaps create new 
challenges, nevertheless, the surplus electricity “would bring hope to Georgia”. 
Companies looking to invest in less developed countries like Georgia need incentives to do 
so. With worldwide competition to attract FDI it is understandable that the Georgian 
government would want to minimise the risk for foreign investors by creating a favourable 
investment climate (Gursoy 2008, 21). When it comes to attracting potential foreign investors 
the country must strike a balance between investor-friendly and revenue beneficial policies. 
Also, the electricity policy should consider consumer demand, as electricity is difficult to 
store (Hope and Skjeret 2008, 3). 
4.1.2 Energy demand 
With a population of 4.5 million, Georgia has a relatively small domestic market (Gursoy 
2008, 20). According to a study from the consulting agency Econ, which was commissioned 
by the government of Georgia, the country needs more hydropower to meet its own demand 
and decrease imports in high demand seasons (Econ 2010a). However, during low demand 
seasons the country has a large surplus of electricity. In 2006 hydro generation constituted 
about 64% of the total electricity supply, while thermal generation and imports accounted for 
27% and 9%, respectively (UNFCCC 2012, 7). However, by 2010 hydropower constituted 
88% of the total power generation (Econ 2010a, 10). Domestic utilisation has therefore 
increased significantly in only a few years. In addition, since 2007 Georgia has been a net 
exporter of electricity to other countries in the region. 
The energy consumption amongst the population is low; Norway consumes six times more 
energy per capita (GA 2011, 63). Despite an increasing demand in Georgia since 2006, 
energy saving measures might offset the increase. A soviet heritage involved the tendency to 
be very energy-inefficient, a legacy which Georgia struggled with throughout the 1990s, but 
this is slowly changing (Econ 2010a, 7). According to the acting director at the Energy 
Efficiency Centre, the introduction of energy saving measures and the rehabilitation of 
existing hydropower plants means that Georgia might be able to meet the domestic electricity 
demands. Several reports from NGOs support this analysis, arguing that greenfield 
hydropower plants are unnecessary for Georgia (e.g. GA 2007).  
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With the domestic demand already satisfied most of the year, where will all the electricity 
from the new hydropower plants go? Market size and projected growth rates are considered to 
be location advantages in the OLI paradigm (Neuhaus 2006, 143). The Georgian electricity 
market is not particularly attractive from an investor’s point of view, with low tariffs and 
mainly saturated electricity demand. However, when one adds the market potential of 
neighbouring Turkey, the picture changes substantially. Turkey has a large and increasing 
population, the economic indicators are on the up, the demand for electricity is rising, and the 
tariffs are higher than in Georgia (Yüksek 2008, 3381). With Turkey in the equation the 
number of potential buyers and expected profits are hugely increased, since the distance to 
this highly attractive market is short (Neuhaus 2006, 143). 
To promote electricity exports, the government decided to increase cross-border capacity by 
building transmissions lines for electricity going to Turkey. This will decrease transport costs 
for investors as well as increase the export capacity (menr.gov.ge 2011e). As Neuhaus (2006, 
144) points out, long-term FDI decisions, such as the construction of hydropower plants, are 
not based merely on the present state but also on predictions of future market demand. The 
prognoses for the electricity market in Turkey have been promising for years (Demirbaş 
2002b, 1884). Both of the hydropower cases studied in this thesis are planning to export a 
large quantity of the electricity produced to Turkey (MacDonald 2012, 54). There are profits 
to be made by exporting electricity to Turkey, as forecasts show that the Turkish market is 
lucrative and is likely to remain so for years to come (investingeorgia.org). Accordingly, 
selling the excess power to the Turkish market is vital. 
The consulting agency Econ suggested in a report that there are two potential options for 
Georgia’s surplus electricity. Option one is to export to other markets, such as to 
neighbouring Turkey or Azerbaijan (Econ 2010a, 19). A calculation from the same company 
forecasts an annual income of between 32 and 200 million USD (ibid., 19). Option two is to 
promote the country as an attractive place for energy-intensive industry, such as cement and 
aluminium production, with the incentive being the low electricity cost over the lifespan of an 
industrial plant (Econ 2010a, 19–20). The latter option can hardly compete with the first one 
when it comes to the amount of hard currency inflow. With the significant fluctuation 
between the seasons, there is likely to be a large surplus of energy during the summer months. 
Hydropower investments are typically expensive, irreversible and long-lived, and one of the 
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particular issues with electricity is that it is difficult to store (Hope and Skjeret 2008, 3). 
Therefore, the export of electricity is a viable option for greenfield hydropower plants because 
Georgia is likely to have a large surplus during the summer months. 
Georgia has ambitions to export electricity to Eastern Europe, but is dependent on Turkey as a 
transit country (investinbatumi.ge 2011). As part of the energy strategy the government 
decided to invest in new transmission capacity to Turkey (menr.gov.ge 2011e). A senior 
adviser to the minister of energy and natural resources stated that when it comes to 
hydropower development Georgia is “landlocked” without Turkey. She also noted that 
Georgia has tried to conform to EU standards, but these efforts might prove to be in vain if 
Turkey does not also implement the same standards. The EU’s impact on Georgia’s energy 
policy is interesting, but it lies beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Georgia had little industry left after the fall of the Soviet Union. One might ask if the two 
strategies could be combined, since the development of heavy industry could both provide 
revenues and create long-term employment. Some evidence suggests that in the long run the 
manufacture of goods can be more profitable than exporting the raw materials, although this 
in part depends on the type of manufacturing (Milford 2013). In the end the government chose 
option one, and has focused on developing hydropower plants with exports to Turkey and 
perhaps to other markets in the future. In the short term the government needed finances to 
build the hydropower plants, and accordingly reforms were rapidly implemented to make 
Georgia an attractive hydropower investment site.  
The location advantages mentioned above require that that the company can utilise the local 
potential in order to make a profitable investment, e.g. closeness to the market (Neuhaus 
2006, 145). An apparent advantage for the Ajar project is its physical proximity to Turkey, 
and that country’s historical and economic connection with Ajara (Pelkmans 2006, 7, 183). 
The plants are only a few miles from Turkey, and through its mother company the Ajar 
project first-hand connections to and knowledge about the hydropower sector in Turkey. 
While the Norwegian AGL does not have the advantage of proximity, it nevertheless has 
other ownership advantages related to knowledge of the market. One individual on the 
management team had previously worked in the consulting agency Econ Poyry, which 
advised Georgia on the energy sector (see e.g. Econ 2010a), and was an advisor to the 
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Georgian government on the country’s hydropower development, before joining CEG in 2010 
(cleanenergygroup.no 2011c). In addition, the management team included the former chief 
executive officer of the Norwegian company Statkraft, Europe’s largest renewable energy 
company, who oversaw the company’s investments in leading emerging hydro markets such 
as India, Peru and Turkey (statkraft.no). Hence, the AGL project also has managerial 
expertise that will facilitate the operation in Georgia. Both companies are utilising their 
management ownership advantage by investing in the sector.  
4.1.3 The protests 
As with most comprehensive reforms, there are opponents to the schemes. For the investor it 
is a drawback if the project should attract national and local protests. This section will outline 
some of the general protest against the greenfield hydropower plants. The affected population 
and several NGOs in Georgia are worried that the construction of the greenfield hydropower 
projects will trigger environmental disasters or cause severe environmental harm (iwpr.net). 
In addition, there are fears about forced resettlement and lack of compensation during the land 
acquisition process (GA 2007, 12). The energy policy since 2006 has been criticised by 
NGOs, and several of the interviewees stated that a major drawback of the policy is its 
avoidance of concreteness.  
The co-chair of the Greens Movement, one of the country’s largest and oldest environmental 
NGOs, stated that while the energy policy expresses high ambitions for increasing 
hydropower capacity, there is no clearly articulated policy concerning what the government 
plans to do with all the surplus electricity. In addition, she noted that all social and 
environmental issues must be settled before any kind of work can begin. The co-chair also 
said that the NGO’s main objection to the new greenfield hydropower plants was that it is 
difficult to see any major benefit for Georgia; the country might get new hydropower plants, 
but that is about it.  
These views were echoed in interviews with a representative from another large 
environmental protection NGO, Green Alternative, which is perhaps the NGO that most 
strongly opposes the current hydropower development (greenalt.org 2012a). Since 2006 
Green Alternative has devoted attention to hydropower development because it has been 
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concerned about the potential social and environmental damage of all the greenfield 
hydropower projects. The interviewee at Green Alternative said there were too many projects 
too soon, and that the government was thinking in a very business-like manner by undertaking 
all the projects. Although he was not sure exactly how many developments were currently 
contracted, he emphasised that the projects were numerous, and for that reason Green 
Alternative had decided to allocate its resources mainly against the larger projects. One of its 
main campaigns in 2012 was called “No to big dams!” (greenalt.org 2012a). However, the 
interviewee at Green Alternative also said that the NGO is not actually against large 
hydropower in general; rather, it seeks a strategy for how the development can be optimised 
for Georgia’s sake. He was sceptical about the energy policy since 2006, saying that there is 
no strategic plan for how Georgia might benefit, and consequently there is a significant risk 
that the country will lose more than it will gain. 
The project coordinator at the Aarhus Centre also noted the lack of a concrete energy strategy. 
She believed that the government’s plan was one-sided, since a large demand for hydropower 
was declared after 2006 but without much attention to the wider picture. The project 
coordinator said that openness and transparency are important, and with a clear strategy it 
would be easier for experts to comment on the development and to contribute with nuanced 
criticisms and suggestions. A lawyer at Transparency Georgia also thought that the energy 
policy was unspecific, and that Georgia relied on concepts but had no clear plan.  
The two interviewees at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources also agreed that the 
2006 policy was concept-oriented. The head of the Investment Projects Division at the 
ministry said that although the energy resolution of 2006 spoke in general terms, he believed 
it was suitably formulated because it clearly stated what the framework of the energy sector 
development ought to be. He believed that it accurately described the situation of the 
hydropower sector, pointing out the need for rehabilitation as well as the need to increase the 
electricity capacity. He further noted that Georgia has abundant rivers, but little oil or gas
14
, 
and the country had to utilise its own domestic potential so that it might achieve energy 
independence.  
                                                 
14
 Georgia has some smaller reserves in Samgori. 
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The activists at Green Alternative does not agree with this assessment. According to him, 
electricity accounts for just 25% of the total energy consumption. Thus, he believes that the 
government is wrong when it claims that Georgia will achieve energy independence through 
the construction of new plants and rehabilitation of existing ones. Even if all the planned 
hydropower projects are constructed, electricity still accounts for only a quarter of the energy 
balance. The NGO is sceptical of the major investment in greenfield hydropower, since it 
does not solve all the energy problems of Georgia, but it does increase the risk of social and 
environmental challenges. 
In addition, the two local environmental NGOs were concerned that many of the decisions 
made within the hydropower reform have no clear rational from the government. One of these 
is the ten years–rule, by which the hydropower producers will have to sell electricity to the 
domestic Georgian market during the high demand winter months (December to February) for 
ten years (menr.gov.ge 2011c). Green Alternative asks “why ten years why not five or 
twenty?” Not one of the interviewees knew why the period of ten years had been chosen, not 
even the two interviewees at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. One of the civil 
servants thought it would be a reasonable time for both the investor and the country, which 
would have better energy conditions in ten year’s time. Reasonable or not, an official 
justification could not be found. 
Nonetheless, it makes sense to secure electricity for the domestic market because the tariffs 
are higher in Turkey during the high demand season (Yüksek 2008, 3376). Without this 
strategy, Georgia could be left with a shortage of domestic electricity, despite producing more 
than enough. In addition, it is not a great inconvenience for the investor who is still 
guaranteed sales for those months (investinbatumi.ge 2011). This is one of the few known 
preconditions for FDI in hydropower greenfield constructions, whereby the Georgians are 
securing a quantity of supply for some years. In ten years’ time the energy situation may have 
changed and such a policy may be unnecessary, yet it is one of several decisions where the 





Another concern for the NGOs was the potential increases in electricity tariffs for the 
Georgian population. The electricity tariffs of the greenfield hydropower plants must balance 
between being affordable to the population, and bringing in enough revenue for the investor 
to make a profit. Neither of the two companies would offer a special electricity price for the 
affected population, and no other hydropower project in Georgia has offered to do so either. 
In public meetings about the two cases the question of tariffs came up frequently, since the 
local population was concerned that the electricity prices may increase (UNFCCC 2006, 39). 
As will be discussed below, this might be a reason for concern. 
Electricity prices have been low in Georgia, and prior to 2008 the low price level and weak 
payment collection meant that the electricity market was not seen as commercially profitable 
(Econ 2010b, 23). Though the tariffs have increased considerably over the last fifteen years, 
Georgia still has the region’s cheapest energy supplies (ibid). The distribution tariffs are 
considered to be low at about 8 USD cent/Kwh excluding VAT, which is well below the 
Western European average (Econ 2010a, 3). In the past, the tariffs during the summer months 
have been very low, due to a large surplus of electricity combined with limited export 
capacity (Econ 2010b, 23). The situation has changed with increasing prices and new 
transmission lines for electricity export. A forecast of a profitable tariff is an important 
consideration for potential investors in greenfield hydropower plants.  
As for Georgia’s neoliberal policy path, the liberalisation of the energy market and the 
encouragement of export are not likely to decrease the price of electricity. On the contrary, 
such measures tend to increases the tariffs (Hope and Skjeret 2008, 3). In addition, the surplus 
electricity will not help reduce the price for Georgian consumers, as the surplus will be 
exported to Turkey (tol.org). Turkey has been actively promoted as an important consumer of 
Georgia’s excess electricity (investinbatumi.ge 2011). The government has constructed 500 
and 153 KV power transmission lines to Turkey to increase the export capacity (menr.gov.ge 
2011c). The government is probably aware of the risk that domestic tariffs will increase due 
to the construction of new transmission lines, but for obvious reasons it does not want to 
highlight this aspect of the development.  
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The National Electricity and Water Regulatory Commission (GNERC) is responsible for 
regulating the power sector (gnerc.com). Among other tasks, it sets the transmission tariffs 
(Econ 2010a, 29). GNERC is an independent agency, but the Greens Movement and Green 
Alternative NGOs have questioned its status. The anonymous interviewee suggested that 
GNERC might be subject to political pressure, and could, for example, be pressured not to 
adjust tariffs according to inflation. This could lead to the erosion of investors’ income (Econ 
2010a, 23). 
The tariffs for greenfield hydropower plants are fully deregulated. With no tariffs set for these 
plants, foreign investors are free to negotiate the price and the market (Econ 2010b, 13). 
According to records from public meetings between the investors and the affected people, the 
investors avoid the question of tariffs by claiming that such matters will be settled by 
GNERC, and the private companies cannot decide on this issue (UNFCCC 2012, 60, 
UNFCCC 2006, 39). However, while it is indeed GNERC who sets the rate, the system 
allows the producers to agree on certain tariffs to reduce the risk for investors. With the 
investors in the greenfield hydropower plants negotiating with GNERC, companies might be 
able to ensure acceptable returns before committing to a project (Econ 2010a, 14). For the 
investors, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits may make the hydropower projects 
more profitable (ibid., 14). In November 2012 the AGL project registered with UNFCCC as a 
CDM project. Accordingly, the project is the first greenfield hydropower project to obtain 
registration with UNFCCC in Georgia (adjaristsqali.com 2013a).  
It is clear that increasing tariffs will never be politically popular. The government hopes to 
prevent increasing prices by phasing out thermal power production. Thermal generation is 
more expensive and less environmentally friendly than domestically generated hydropower 
(Econ 2010a, 16). The interviewee from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
mentioned that the government had built a new high voltage line to Turkey at “our own 
expense”. This means that government revenue has been spent to construct more transmission 
capacity. These investments are costly for the Georgian national budget, but good 
infrastructure might be an important precondition for making Georgia a lucrative investment 
location. Clearly the new transmission line is good news for investors looking to export 
electricity to the Turkish market, and it increases the location advantage of being close to that 
attractive market. With higher tariffs, there is more profit to be made by selling to the Turkish 
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market than by selling the electricity in Georgia. In addition, the Turkish market is far larger 
and is increasing faster due to long-term economic growth (Demirbaş 2002a, 27). Yet another 
advantage for investors is that the greenfield hydropower plants have priority access for 
transmission to Turkey (investinbatumi.ge 2011). 
How the developments will benefit the Georgian population remains more uncertain. Unlike 
some of its post-soviet neighbours, Georgia does not subsidise the population’s energy 
consumption (Lampietti 2004, 27). The curtailing of governmental subsidies can be seen as a 
consequence of the Washington Consensus (Jomo and Fine 2006, 26). Though the electricity 
price as of 2013 is still relatively cheap, it should be noted that many Georgian households 
rely on fuel wood for heating and cooking, with this source of energy forming a large part of 
their consumption (Lampietti 2004, 9). If the development of greenfield hydropower plants 
increases the price of electricity, it may lead to the poorer sections of the Georgian population 
increasing their use of “dirty fuels” such as wood and kerosene (ibid., 9). This would be an 
unfortunate environmental consequence, and it remains to be seen whether tariffs will be 
influenced by commercial or political considerations. 
4.3 Taxation 
Tax revenues are crucial for funding public infrastructure and services. On the one hand, 
foreign investors obviously prefer to be taxed as little as possible, but they are willing to pay 
as long as the investment prognoses look profitable. On the other hand, the government tries 
to promote greenfield hydropower projects as an important part of the country’s economic 
development, but civil society remains sceptical. It has been questioned whether the 
greenfield hydropower construction boom will bring sizeable economic gains for Georgia 
(tol.org). A direct way of benefiting is through taxation, which this section will examine in 
more detail. 
The neoliberal ideal is that the tax base should be broadened and tax rates cut (Jomo and Fine 
2006, 26). Georgia has followed this model, and has altered the tax code several times over 
the last few years. Though the tax code has been simplified, an IFC survey from 2006 showed 
that few business owners understood the tax legislation. This is perhaps unsurprising as the 
legislation was amended seventeen times between January 2005 and November 2006 (Jones 
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2013, 121). Expatriates living in Georgia suggested that although the tax regime was 
simplified, there was still some uncertainty about which taxes foreign businesses had to pay. 
At the state agency “Invest in Batumi” the officers said that the government is striving to 
move towards the best international practices in taxation. Thus, the country has undergone 
several procedures of simplification that have targeted both the population and the business 
sector. The amendments to the tax code were inspired by the IMF and the World Bank (Davis 
and Kruse 2007, 1096). The reforms have been a notable success, since it is believed that the 
simplified tax regulations have improved tax collection since 2005 (Transparency 2011c, 1). 
According to the EDBI, Georgia ranks in thirty-third place globally when it comes to tax 
reform (WB 2013, 66). Tax improvements include simplified export and import procedures, 
for instance, in 2005 the corporate profit tax was reduced from 20% to 15% (Transparency 
2011c, 2). The improvements are aimed at making Georgia an attractive business location 
globally, and it has achieved some international recognition; for example in 2008 Forbes 
Magazine
15
 labelled Georgia as the “4th Least Tax-Burdened Country” (nbiexpo.com). 
However, the location advantage of having liberal tax regulations might not yield much 
revenue to Georgia in the short term. According to the interviewee at Green Alternative, the 
Georgian tax system allows tax depreciation. He stated that it might be difficult to obtain 
income taxes from the greenfield hydropower projects because the investors can report high 
spending for years and use this as a way to avoid reporting positive net income in their 
financial statements. Thus, he concluded that Georgia is losing a lot more than it is gaining 
from the hydropower developments. 
The cost of export is an essential issue for foreign investors in the hydropower sector, since 
the greenfield hydroelectric projects are export-oriented. In Georgia there are no customs 
tariffs on export and re-export (Batumi Invest 2012). In addition, it is worth mentioning that 
Georgia has a free trade agreement with Turkey, facilitating trade between the two countries 
(ibid.). This seems to be inspired by neoliberal theory, where tariffs are to be replaced by 
quotas and reduced as quickly as possible. This is in connection with the “liberalisation of 
FDI”, where FDI was to be encouraged by removing the barriers that prevent foreign 
companies from investing in the domestic market (Jomo and Fine 2006, 26). These reforms 
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 An American business magazine, perhaps best known for its list of billionaires. 
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make the country more attractive for potential investors as they increase the location 
advantage in the OLI paradigm. 
The head of the Investment Projects Division at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 
noted that after the hydropower plants have been in operation for perhaps ten to fifteen years, 
it might be an idea to reconsider the current tax regime and consider the introduction of 
additional taxation. For the moment, however, it is more important to have incentives for 
potential investors, particularly little or no taxation. Georgia did not have the best bargaining 
position at the outset of 2006, but the position might change in the coming years.  
Another tax that should be mentioned is property tax, but the two local environmental NGOs 
do not believe that this will generate much tax revenue either. Georgian property tax is low, 
ranging from zero to 1% (investinbatumi.ge 2011). While 1% is not much, it is still a stable 
source of revenue, especially from a long-term perspective. Some of the land plots that will be 
acquired by the two cases are state-owned, and by buying up the land the companies will 
create a new and stable source of state revenue. The AGL project envisages paying a 
municipal tax of approximately 1% of the project’s property value per year; the exact figure is 
currently unknown, but is believed to be in the range of 1 to 3 million USD. The tax revenue 
will be allocated to the local municipality where the power plants are located (MacDonald 
2012, 55). No such estimate was available from the Ajar project. This demonstrates that there 
will be a significant increase in tax revenue in the local municipalities. 
Hydropower is a long-term investment, and the financial results must be considered over the 
lifespan of the hydropower plants, which is not known yet. In the short term there may be a 
limited increase in revenues because tax rates are low, as is the case with property tax. 
However, even a small increase in revenue is better than none, although increased budget 
revenues are likely to be modest in the short term (tol.org). The conclusion must be that it is 
difficult to estimate whether the greenfield projects will make a substantial contribution 
financially. However, a more pressing matter is the question of land acquisition for the 
hydropower projects.  
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4.4 Land issues 
This section will demonstrate that the issue of private property and land acquisition poses an 
important challenge in post-soviet Georgia. There was a consensus among the interviewed 
stakeholders that there are several challenges connected to the execution of property rights, 
both for Georgia in general and directly related to the hydropower cases. 
Private property rights are at the core of a market economy. Privatisation in a broad sense 
includes creating and reforming property rights and the redistribution of control over the 
means of production (Hibou 2004, 183). For all post-soviet countries, going from a system 
without private ownership to one where actors engage as sellers and buyers was an enormous 
challenge. Privatisation was viewed as an irreversible and unavoidable reform process that 
would ensure the transition to a market economy (Åslund 2007, 33). With the privatisation 
process, Georgians were able to register and become private landowners as in any other 
capitalist country. Neoliberalism promotes privatisation as a means to reduce state 
interference (Jomo and Fine 2006, 150). Initially, privatisation was not a success for the 
former Soviet Union, while the Eastern European countries were more successful in the 
implementation of privatisation reforms (Åslund 2007, 169), indicating that the length of time 
under soviet influence makes a difference (Stiglitz 1999, 1). Jomo and Fine (2006, 157) argue 
that the privatisation process is shaped by the historical, economic and social context in which 
it is implemented. Hence, they argue that policies should be chosen based on the condition of 
the country’s needs rather than on neoliberal ideology (ibid.,159). Thus, one could argue that 
the privatisation process in Georgia has been shaped by past and current challenges.  
Initially in the 1990s the Georgian privatisation process had a slow start, which might have 
encouraged the post-Rose Revolution government to pursue privatisation as a means of 
increasing efficiency and revenue. Under President Saakashvili the privatisation process 
accelerated, bringing budgetary benefits; in 2007 15% of the budget was accounted for by the 
sales of state property (Jones 2013, 200). However, the selling of assets only yielded profits in 
the short term, and additionally the process was opaque and led to public distrust (ibid.). The 
constitution, the law and international norms and regulations guarantee property protection. 
However, as there have been several cases of property right infringements since the Rose 
Revolution, the population may have reason to remain sceptical (Transparency 2012, 5). 
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Reforms since 2003 have resulted in limited improvements, and property rights are still not 
secure (Jones 2013, 200). Infringement of property rights is particularly likely to happen in 
Georgia’s fastest growing sectors, namely the tourist and construction industries 
(Transparency 2012, 4, 12). Hence, it is not surprising that stakeholders emphasised property 
rights as one of the main challenges related to greenfield hydropower development. 
4.4.1 Registering property 
The two hydropower companies have both struggled with the land acquisition process, as will 
be discussed below. The NGOs were particularly critical of the status of property protection 
on behalf of the Georgian population. The weaknesses of property protection include a weak 
legislative apparatus and the lack of a national resettlement policy (Transparency 2011a, 5). 
The government representatives, the NGOs and the two companies all express in the 
interviews that it is a challenge that many Georgians living in the affected areas of the 
greenfield hydropower projects have not registered their property. This was creating 
inconvenience for all parties involved.  
According to the activist at Green Alternative, there are several reasons why Georgians have 
not registered their property. Partly this is a result of the soviet heritage, where the population 
lived on state-owned land for decades. After independence those Georgians that registered 
their land tended to live in urban areas, but for rural citizens it was not an urgent matter. A 
lawyer at Transparency Georgia noted that the rural population tends to live far from 
registration offices, making it harder for them to obtain their property rights. To a large extent 
Ajara has been moving out of its backwater status after the republic’s “return to Georgia” in 
2004, and major developments along the Black Sea coast have occurred since then. However, 
the inland areas where the two hydropower projects are located have been largely left out of 
this development. It is estimated that many living in the more remote mountainous regions of 
Ajara, such as the affected AGL areas, have never registered their land (Transparency 2011a, 
10).  
An aspect of the post-soviet reality is the frequent amendments of the Georgian legal code. 
Laws regarding property rights have been altered several times since independence, and not 
all Georgians have the right registration papers. This cause difficulty when foreign companies 
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try to acquire land. Another challenge, according to the project coordinator at Caucasus 
Environmental NGO Network, was that the Georgian legal framework has no laws on so-
called traditional ownership, referring to lands that a family has been cultivating for years but 
has had difficulties registering (transparency.ge 2012). In the mountainous areas, the 
population often do not have the official papers even though their land has been in the family 
for generations. Under current law, people living unregistered on state-owned land have no 
right to compensation when hydropower projects acquire the land. Thus, the question of 
potential compensation in such cases is a moral issue for foreign companies rather than a 
question of legal rights, as stated by the lawyer at Transparency Georgia. A report for 
Transparency Georgia notes that the “cases of real property infringement are reported mainly 
in areas where investments or infrastructure projects are planned” (Transparency 2012, 12). 
Accordingly, the greenfield hydropower plants may be at risk of breaching property rights and 
traditional land tenure processes. 
There have been several examples of property rights infringements in post-Rose Revolution 
Georgia (Transparency 2012, 4). In Ajara, Transparency International’s Batumi Office 
reported that this had happened in the republic as well. Between 2007 and 2010 in the village 
of Gonio, a proposed tourist destination located along the Black Sea coast, 271 villagers were 
deprived of their property without any form of compensation. Gonio is not an isolated case; 
this kind of property acquisition is part of the socio-economic and political processes in 
Georgia (Transparency 2011b, 2). However, the interviewee at Transparency Batumi did not 
believe that such a scenario would occur with the hydropower projects in Ajara. Although 
there had been disagreements, it looked like those who were entitled to compensation would 
receive it. She believed that conflicts might still arise, such as the affected population 
demanding more compensation than the companies would be willing to offer. Next we will 
look at land acquisition and discuss the different outcome of these issues in relation to the two 
cases. 
4.4.2 Land acquisition  
There are two forms of resettlement that come about due to project-related land acquisition. 
One is physical displacement, which includes relocation or loss of residence. The second is 
economic displacement, referring to the loss of assets or livelihood. Neither project envisages 
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the former, but the latter is a large part of both projects (UNFCCC 2012, 58). According to 
ESIA studies, no physical resettlement will be necessary for either of the projects, as no 
homes will be flooded when creating the reservoirs (Gamma 2011, 220–222). As there is no 
resettlement, no historical monuments to be flooded and no significant negative 
environmental consequences anticipated, the projects are not among the most controversial in 
Georgia. Still, the construction of the hydro schemes require land, e.g. for reservoirs and 
access roads. Some of the land is private and some is state-owned, and in several cases the 
local population live unregistered on state-owned land (UNFCCC 2006, 40). 
The ESIA report for the Ajar project states that no buildings will be flooded, but it goes on to 
suggest that some people’s living conditions will “be dramatically worsened” (Gamma 2011, 
221). The Ajar project divides landowners into two categories: registered landowners and 
unregistered landowners. Both are entitled to compensation, but the latter are entitled only 
after their ownership is registered. Transparency Batumi will help unregistered owners to 
register, thereby making the local population eligible for compensation. The company does 
not envisage paying those who use land without rights, and they are not obliged to do so by 
Georgian law. The lawyer at Transparency’s Batumi office said that the Ajar project had 
expended a good deal of effort mapping land plots, and had encouraged the local population 
to register their land. The land plots needed for the Ajar project are valued higher than those 
of the AGL project, and consequently the price per square metre is higher at between 8 to 10 
GEL, approximately 4.8 to 6 USD.  
Yet attempts at ownership registration are sometimes challenging. In the summer of 2012, 
sixty locals in the Ajar-affected areas faced difficulties registering private property in the civil 
registry. The main problem was that the local commission had ceased to function during the 
period they wanted to register (transparency.ge 2012), illustrating how difficult it can be for 
the local population to obtain their property rights. The lawyer at International Batumi’s 
office said the organisation followed the hydropower project, and had worked to provide 




As mentioned above, the frequent reforms are a challenge for the land registration, which can 
be seen in the case of the Ajar project. In the election year of 2008
16
 the government launched 
an advertising campaign under the slogan “What is yours is yours”. The aim was to simplify 
the process of registering private persons as landowners. However, after the elections were 
over, new amendments made it harder to register and the registration fee was also increased 
(Transparency 2011b, 3). A similar incident occurred immediately before the parliamentary 
election in 2012. The local government issued documents to the locals so that they could 
register land. This was particularly important for the Ajar project, since the company would 
compensate only those who had registered their property. However, the authorities may have 
been too generous since land certificates were easily issued, including land plots that are not 
usually in public possession, such as parts of river beds. In early 2013 the Ajar project went to 
court in a dispute with several landowners because the company claimed that registrations 
were made incorrectly during the pre-election period and therefore they should be annulled 
(beyondtbilisi.ge 2013).  
The new government does not appear to back the decisions made in the pre-election period, 
which makes the legal status of land registrations granted in this period uncertain. By March 
2013 Transparency Batumi had represented about ten people in court against the company, in 
cases where the parties agreed to negotiate. Even though the construction phase of the project 
has lasted nearly a year, the land acquisition issues are still not completely settled. The PR 
manager at the project said that the problems were a result of the frequent ministerial changes; 
it is one of the features of post-soviet Georgia that government officials are often replaced 
(Jervalidze 2007, 3). Interestingly, in this instance the authorities put the interests of the 
population before the investor. The PR manager at the Ajar project said it had been hard to 
work with frequent ministerial changes, as each new minister introduces new policies. After 
the parliamentary election in October 2012 a new minister of energy and natural resources 
was appointed, a thirty-five-year-old former AC Milan player who entered politics in early 
2012 (menr.gov.ge 2012b).  
Regarding the AGL project and land acquisition, the informant at the project stated that one of 
the best aspects of the project was that there was no physical resettlement and no one had to 
leave their homes. Some will lose land plots, she said, but the company will compensate them 
                                                 
16
 In 2008 were “snap” presidential and parliamentary elections. 
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fairly and equally. A couple of buildings will be flooded, including a petrol station which the 
company will move further up the valley. In addition, the reservoir will also flood parts of the 
main road in the area; this will also be moved (MacDonald 2012). According to the informant 
at AGL, the project spent a great deal of time gathering information for the land acquisition. 
Eventually the company decided to go for a design where all land users, regardless of legal 
status, would get compensation. The AGL project divides landowners into three divisions: 
(registered) landowners, (unregistered) land users, and “illegally seized” plots (UNFCCC 
2006, 55). For unregistered land users, the company will help them and pay for registration in 
the Public Register. Those in the “illegally seized” plots category will also be compensated, 
according to the informant at the AGL project. In effect, for these landowners the company 
will pay double because these plots are state-registered (ibid., 55). The informant at AGL said 
that as a goodwill gesture the company does not differentiate between landowners and land 
users. The AGL project’s policy on land acquisition is in accordance with World Bank/IFC 
standards, or so-called “international best practice” standards. As the IFC is a (financial) co-
developer of the project, the financial institution’s policy has had an impact on the project’s 
policy choice. The institution’s policy is considered to be of a higher standard than the 
Georgian legal framework (GA 2006, 5). Clearly, paying for the land twice is more costly, but 
the advantage is that this strategy may prevent discontent in the local population and decrease 
the risk of becoming involved in court battles that could last for years. 
The price for land acquisition is subject to land assignment, according to which the company 
had two different evaluations. As mentioned by the AGL informant, the National Forensic 
Bureau priced a metre-squared plot of land at 3 to 5.5 GEL (1.8 to 3.3 USD) on average, as 
the state agency tends to put a low value on the land (GA 2006, 25). However, the private 
company Expert-21 assessed the same land and returned an average price of 6 to 8 GEL (3.6 
to 4.9 USD) estimated according to the market price, of which the AGL project plans to 
increase the compensation payments by about 10%. Consequently, for the AGL project the 
price varies from 6 to 10 GEL (3.6 to 6.1 USD) (UNFCCC 2006, 57). Additionally, the 
company will also compensate landowners for any fruit trees lost. The informant at the AGL 
project said that this had been a surprisingly complicated issue, and at the time of the 




4.4.3 Property rights 
In contrast to what the stakeholders have been told, the EDBI rates Georgia in first place out 
of 185 countries on the ease of registering property (WB 2013, 42). Although being number 
one in this ranking is an impressive achievement, it does not reflect the realities of property 
issues. Papava (2009, 203) argues that the government does not protect private ownership, 
and the World Bank’s high rating for Georgia is unrealistic. The ranking implies that the issue 
of property is settled, despite the fact that several challenges remain. It is indeed easy to get 
land registered, but this does not reflect the real state of property rights in the country. It is 
true that it is easy to register land plots online (see napr.gov.ge), but this is not the case for the 
populations of mountainous regions who seldom have computers, let alone access to the 
internet at home. One may therefore question whether these registration tools are there to help 
the people living in the mountainous areas, or merely to meet the standards set by the World 
Bank. The implemented measures seem to have done little to improve the situation for the 
Georgian population. This reform would perhaps be better suited to other countries ranking in 
the top ten in the index, such as Norway or Singapore (doingbusiness.org 2013a). At least in 
these countries most citizens have access to the internet and hence have easier access to the 
execution of their property rights. Georgia presents itself in international advertisements as if 
the legal framework surrounding property conforms to a world standard. Georgia has 
promoted itself as a serious reformer, which is true to an extent, but it still has a long way to 
go before the country will have achieved the adequate execution of property rights for both 
the population and the investors.  
Land acquisition by foreign companies is a controversial issue all over the world. Thus, it is 
not unexpected that some of the population will complain about compensation, nor is it 
unusual that companies feel pressured to compensate for more than the land plot is worth. 
This is not specific to Georgia as a post-soviet country since cases may also be found 
elsewhere. The main point is that there is a lack of adequate reform measures, which should 
include a more accessible registration procedure for the Georgian population, and there is a 
need for a new resettlement act for those who may have to move due to construction. The 
government should focus on the best and most suitable policy for the situation in Georgia, 
rather than the best policy according to an external organisation. The reforms introduced are 
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not harmful for Georgia, but neither are they aimed at helping the population; rather, they are 
intended to facilitate a top EDBI ranking.  
The current situation is not optimal for foreign companies who may not have a clear idea of 
the risks and challenges of the Georgian property market. Political risks should be minimised, 
because hydropower projects are costly and the government should aim to attract good 
investors. For the government, the current situation might allow flexibility, but it may also be 
harmful to private companies and the population. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that the government has used reforms to create a more lucrative 
environment for greenfield FDI. The electricity sector is deregulated and the bureaucratic 
procedures for greenfield investment are substantially reduced. The successes of this strategy 
should be recognised, and they explain why the government has managed to attract several 
investors to the sector in a short handful of years. Georgia has become an attractive location 
for greenfield hydropower investment. Several stakeholders agreed that the energy policy was 
unspecific, but some thought that this was more problematic than others. The NGOs were 
critical not so much of the hydropower itself but of the business-like approach of the 
government, and they were worried that social and environmental aspects were not being 
considered.  
It was noted that there are no taxes on energy exports, and consequently the export of 
electricity will generate little revenue. Tariffs are likely to increase due to the hydropower 
developments. Despite a liberal tax regime with a relatively low tax rate, taxation revenues 
will likely increased due to the greenfield investments. This section has also shown that the 
property situation in Georgia is not stable, for instance, with the Ajar project even well into 
the construction phase of the questions of land registration and land acquisition have not been 
solved, and this is serious for all the stakeholders involved. 
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5 Environmental and social issues   
In this chapter, I will look at the environmental and social impacts of the hydropower plants. 
The combination of environmental and social issues is inspired by the fact that most Georgian 
environmental NGOs are both environmentally and socially concerned. Indeed, Green 
Alternative and the Greens Movement, the local environmental NGOs interviewed for this 
thesis, do not focus solely on environmental issues but also have a strong social agenda. 
Green Alternative’s profile has an apparently stronger social perspective than environmental, 
especially when it comes to hydropower. The interviewee at Green Alternative said that they 
were activists rather than researchers in the natural sciences. In contrast, the Greens 
Movement has a more diverse staff ranging from politicians and lawyers to fish experts. 
Though this NGO has the expertise to evaluate environmental issues, it also places emphasis 
on social issues in response to the social and economic situation in Georgia. As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, the local NGOs are sceptical that Georgia will benefit from the greenfield 
hydropower plants. 
The minister of energy and natural resources from 2007 to 2012, Alexander Khetaguri, has 
stated several times that the greenfield hydropower plants will improve the social and 
economic situation in the affected areas (georgianamerica.com).This chapter will also discuss 
whether the FDI inflow can have positive social and economic effect for Georgia. I will look 
at if the hydropower development will be beneficial in terms of job creation, and the public 
relationship between the foreign company and the affected population will be analysed.  
5.1 The Ministries: power struggle? 
Jones claims that neither the government nor the population prioritises the environment 
(2013, 261). This is perhaps too broad of a statement, although even the civil servant at the 
Ministry of Environment Protection admitted that the environment had not been a “top 
priority”. As the civil servant pointed out, the population will consider food and work before 
thinking about environmental issues.  
According to the two hydropower companies, AGL and Ajar, they have mainly dealt with the 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. The ministry issues the concessions, permits and 
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licenses needed for the hydropower projects, as a consequence of the restructuring process 
among the ministries after the Rose Revolution. The reorganisation of another ministry, the 
Ministry of Environment Protection, was brought up in several of the interviews to illustrate 
the government’s priorities since 2006.  
The Ministry of Environment Protection and Natural Resources of Georgia was established in 
1991. The ministry was later renamed the Ministry of Environment Protection, when the 
management of natural resources was transferred to another ministry (moe.gov.ge). Within a 
few years the licensing for exploitation of natural resources went from the Ministry of 
Environment Protection to the Ministry of Economy, before ending up within the remit of the 
Ministry of Energy
17
 (civil.ge 2013). The environmental NGOs interpreted the transfer as the 
government whishing to separate issues of the environment and sustainable development. It 
might also indicate that the government views natural resources as something that ought to be 
exploited, not protected (Jones 2013, 263).  
It was difficult to find an official rationale for the restructuring of the ministries. According to 
a civil servant at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the logic was that the 
ministry would be in correspondence with neighbouring countries, and thus could “talk 
completely on all issues when meeting at ministry level”. While this is true for trade partners 
such as Turkey, Armenia and Kazakhstan, it is not the case for other countries, for instance 
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia. Some companies may prefer to invest in countries 
that have institutional similarities, so the restructuring may have increased the location 
advantage for Turkish companies (Neuhaus 2006, 145). Furthermore, in the civil servant’s 
opinion, another argument may have been that the Ministry of Energy was better equipped 
and more experienced at handling major projects, and therefore it would be more efficient if 
the ministry also dealt with the licensing. However, he strongly objected to the term “power 
ministry”, saying that such a thing only existed in the soviet past. 
The Ministry of Environment Protection has been criticised for its lack for professionalism 
(Jones 2013, 262). During the soviet period the Ministries were plagued with corruption. With 
deregulation, a reduced amount of permits and simplified procedures, the fight against 
corruption has been a success. One concrete illustration of this is the fact that many 
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 Post-election 2012, this looks as will be changed again in 2013, as the natural resources department will be 
transferred back to Ministry of Environmental Protection (civil.ge). 
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experienced but corrupt officers have been removed from state positions (GA 2011, 31). On 
the one hand, this was an effective method of getting rid of unreliable civil servants. On the 
other hand, however, the ministry now has fewer experienced employees, and the 
inexperienced staff who remain may make ill-informed decisions (GA 2006, 38). 
Accordingly, the ministry has been criticised for not fulfilling all its obligations. Green 
Alternative even stated bluntly that the staff members at the ministry are “inexperienced and 
incompetent” (GA 2011, 31). 
The civil servant at the Ministry of Environment Protection said it had been a blow to the 
ministry when it lost the natural resources department. At the same time, he did believe there 
was some logic to it, since having all licenses under the same roof could promote 
effectiveness. In effect, the procedures are efficient and rapid, which is appealing for investors 
who are able to avoid time-consuming bureaucracy. Accordingly, the restructuring of the 
ministries may have increased the location advantage of Georgia over more bureaucratic 
countries.  
However, the discussion of the Ministry of Environment Protection does not end here. The 
project coordinator at the Aarhus Centre said that the Ministry of Environment Protection has 
lost power year after year as new legislation has been introduced to create a business climate 
that is more suitable for development. During 2009 and 2010 there was a discussion regarding 
the abolition of the Ministry of Environment Protection, with suggestions about whether to 
reposition it as a department under some other ministry (Jones 2013, 263). This suggested 
downscaling of the Ministry of Environment Protection attracted heavy criticism from civil 
society and particularly from the environmental NGOs. The activist at Green Alternative 
believed that strong objections from a range of NGOs prevented the downscaling from taking 
place. According to the co-chair of the Greens Movement, who is also a former minister of 
environment protection, the organisation objected strongly because it saw the restructuring as 
a way of pushing environmental issues to the periphery of the political agenda. The 
coordinator at the Aarhus Centre asserts that the NGOs’ protests were successful since the 
ministry maintained its status. 
The government’s priorities may also be noted in the national budget. For years the Ministry 
of Environment Protection has been at the end of the line to receive ministerial funding (Jones 
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2013, 236). The civil servant from the Ministry of Environment Protection objected to the 
notion that the environment was not an important issue for the government, although he 
admitted that it had not been a top priority. Changes since 2006 have made the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources stronger. The civil servant at the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources said that he personally believed that Georgia should develop the 
hydropower plants “even at the expense of the environment”. Of course, the environmental 
issues at stake should not be disregarded, but he believed that the greenfield hydropower 
constructions would have more benefits than drawbacks. In summary, ministerial 
restructuring may have improved the efficiency of dealing with greenfield projects, but one 
question that still needs to be asked is whether the changes might have weakened the Ministry 
of Environment Protection. 
5.1.1 Legal framework 
There is disagreement about whether the environmental laws are adequate to protect the 
environment in Georgia. Neither Green Alternative nor the Greens Movements see the legal 
framework as sufficient. However, at the Aarhus Centre, the coordinator is satisfied with the 
framework, but she stated that although the current legal framework meets the international 
EISA standards, there is a long way to go before access to information is ensured. The 
director of Gamma Consulting agrees with the Aarhus Centre that the legal standards are 
adequate to protect the environment, and added that the Georgian legal framework has 
similarities with that of the EBRD. Further, the director stated that his company tries to act in 
accordance with international conventions, but they are also dependent on the “style of the 
investor”. He said that each company had its own style and approach, which was something 
the company respected as long as they were in accordance with the Georgian legal 
framework. The Norwegian investors in the AGL project consider the laws and regulations 
adequate for protecting the environment. An environmental NGO expatriate working in 
Tbilisi agreed with this, noting that the laws are in place but the challenge lies in monitoring 
and enforcement.  
Having laws and regulations on paper is one thing, but equally important is the practical 
implementation of this framework. The civil servant at the Ministry of Environment 
Protection reported that the situation for the ministry was not as bad as the NGOs sometimes 
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depicted it (e.g. in GA 2006), but he admitted that budgets had decreased due to structural 
changes. In consequence, the ministry was faced with challenges in terms of monitoring the 
construction projects, caused by the fact that they did not have enough staff. This has been the 
case for some years, the civil servant noted. According to Jones, ensuring the implementation 
of the law is difficult without the ability to monitor behaviour (2013, 262). 
As a report from Green Alternative states, this situation leads to “a neglect of environmental 
concerns when making important decisions” (GA 2011, 31). The activist interviewed at Green 
Alternative asserted that the legal reforms since 2006 have been “business orientated”, with 
the further implication that the government had not given environmental issues much 
attention. The co-chair at the Greens Movement raised the unanswered question of who would 
be responsible if construction led to environmental disasters such as landslides. The informant 
at AGL said that the company had not written specifics on the issue in the contract, but stated 
that the company would compensate if the project was ever proven to have contributed to 
substantial environmental harm. The activist at Green Alternative noted that the issue of 
compensation was important, particularly in the light of a legal amendment introduced in 
March 2012. This amendment enables the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to 
negotiate with private companies about financial compensation for environmental harm. In 
practice, the state gets financial compensation in exchange for not taking legal action against 
the company (GA 2012b,8). Green Alternative argues that the law contradicts the Aarhus 
Convention, as it does not promote a transparent framework, but rather promotes behind the 
scenes negotiations between companies and the government (ibid.)  
The activist at Green Alternative thought this was unfortunate as it demonstrated that the 
government is more concerned with revenue than with environmental protection. The NGOs 
thought the law was unacceptable in terms of sustainable development since it left the door 
open for corrupt deals and the neglect of environmental protection (GA 2012b, 2). In addition, 
the NGOs claim that the law was quickly drafted and was implemented without external 
consultation (ibid.). The interviewee at the Energy Efficiency Centre took a more pragmatic 
approach, believing that the most important issue was for the government to receive 
compensation for situations where construction projects cause damage to nature. Revenue is 
important for Georgia. Still, such a legal framework might indicate that it is easier to get or 
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buy forgiveness than it is to obtain environmental permissions, a point we will come back to. 
First, however, the environmental impact of the projects will be discussed. 
5.2 ESIA reports 
An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) evaluates the potential impact of the 
construction and operation of hydropower projects. It projects environmental impacts and 
tries to avoid or mitigate them (Boyle 2004, 413). The ESIA documents are available in both 
Georgian and English. Both cases are the subject of comprehensive reports that address a 
range of issues, but I will not go into detail here (for further information see Gamma 2011 and 
MacDonald 2012). Instead, I will discuss the framework of the EISA in connection with the 
cases.  
The coordinator at the Aarhus Centre said that the legal basis for granting environmental 
permits is satisfactory, since it clearly sets out the procedures required. There are some 
drawbacks, she noted, but the framework itself is adequate. The main drawback, according to 
the project coordinator, was that the government had chosen not to carry out ESIA for all 
hydropower projects. While smaller projects under 13 MW tend to have less social impact, 
they may still cause relatively large environmental consequences (Bakken, Sundt et al. 2012, 
41).  
Regarding the two cases under examination in this study, both projects are labelled as so-
called run-of-river projects (UNFCCC 2006). Run-of-river hydroelectric is a type of 
generation where the natural river flow is utilised and little or no water storage is necessary 
(runofriverpower.com 2012). In this case, the classification refers to the limited amount of 
water storage (reservoirs) in the hydropower projects. The advantage of having smaller 
reservoirs is that they have less impact on the surrounding environment and municipalities. 
Therefore, they generally have a much smaller social and environmental impact than 
traditional large-reservoir hydropower projects. Also, this model reduces the likelihood that 
local communities may lose their houses or farmland (runofriverpower.com 2012). However, 
a technical drawback is that there is little possibility to adjust electricity production according 
to demand. The plants will generate according to seasonal flows, and therefore the power 
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production will be higher in the spring months. As the water storage volume is small, this 
model does not reduce the flood risk in the region.  
The company Gamma Consulting prepared the ESIA for the Ajar project. According to the 
director of Gamma Consulting, the ESIA report for the Ajar project was carried out in 
accordance with both Georgian guidelines and those of the EBRD (European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development). A three-step cascade is planned, where the reservoirs will 
be 0.46, 0.88 and 0.90 km2 for each step, respectively (UNFCCC 2006, 34). No diversion 
tunnel, pressure pipe or the like will be needed, a feature that reduces environmental impact. 
There will be fish passages for all the dams so that fish can to travel upstream and 
downstream in the river (Gamma 2011, 89). The hydropower cascades will operate using 
water from the Chorokhi River and on the regulated water of the Adjaristsqali River (since the 
Ajar hydropower plant is downstream of the AGL project’s planned plants). The ESIA report 
states that the impact on wildlife will be of a temporary nature, with the area returning to 
normal when the construction works have finished. Some local climate changes are expected 
near the reservoirs, such as increased humidity (UNFCCC 2006, 34). 
According to the EISA, the hydropower plants will not have any significant impact on the 
Black Sea coastline. This is due to the fact that the Machakhelistkali and Adjaristsqali rivers 
have a limited role in sediment transporting, and the Chorokhi no longer transports sediment 
(UNFCCC 2006, 35). On this point, however, the environmental NGOs Green Alternative and 
the Greens Movement disagree with the report. Both organisations expressed concern about 
the projects’ impacts on the sediments of the river, and the impact on the Black Sea coastline 
has been a major issue, a view shared by the local municipalities (UNFCCC 2006, 36). The 
co-chair at the Greens Movement was particularly sceptical, since this organisation believes 
the construction of the plants will decrease the fish population, which would be particularly 
critical for the Black Sea salmon. Hydropower projects are known for causing difficulties for 
fish movement (Hanley and Barbier 2009, 296). The director of Gamma Consulting does not 
think this is likely to happen because there will be fish passages built into all three dams. The 
environmental studies done by Gamma Consulting claim that the Ajar project might have an 
impact, but that it will be insignificant (see ESIA by Gamma 2011). Nevertheless, the NGOs 
and the local population remain sceptical, despite the statements of the ESIA. 
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Regarding the AGL project, the British engineering company Mott MacDonald conducted the 
ESIA studies, while Gamma Consulting conducted the pre-studies. The CEG and the IFC 
both financed the studies, for which the estimated cost is approximately 12 million USD. The 
company states that this ensures “international best practice”, which is part of the project’s 
operational policy (UNFCCC 2012, 52). The outline of the operational phase of the AGL 
project states that it will develop a system to manage environmental and social impacts, 
according to international standards like the ISO 14001
18
. In the ESIA, all the potential 
impacts have mitigation suggestions to avoid or reduce the effects. This is in accordance with 
both national laws and international standards, particularly the IFC guidelines. The activist at 
Green Alternative said that the AGL projects tries to conduct these studies properly, in 
contrast to several similar hydropower projects in Georgia. The Ajar project will flood an area 
of about 0.64 km2, with parts of the flooded land being owned by the local population. As the 
AGL project has a small reservoir, the changes to the local climate are believed to be 
insignificant (ibid., 60). However, several locals have expressed concerns that the project will 
cause ecological deterioration (ibid, 57). It is understandable that the population is sceptical 
towards the easy dismissal that the project will “not cause substantial damage” (ibid.). One 
characteristic of hydropower construction is that some of the consequences are irreversible, 
and this has been a cause for concern among the local population (Hope and Skjeret 2008, 3).  
Another issue is seismic activity. Indeed, the South Caucasus is one of the world’s most 
seismically active regions (Müller-Kraenner 2008, 116). A major earthquake could damage 
pipelines and hydropower plants, which could potentially lead to environmental harm, with 
oil spillage and flooding in worst-case scenarios (Müller-Kraenner 2008, 116). At the same 
time, the likelihood of these scenarios is low, and potential investors tend to avoid very risky 
projects. Nevertheless, the mountainous areas of Ajara are prone to mudslides, and these do 
occur, resulting in loss of agricultural lands, houses and sometimes even lives (civil.ge 2008). 
In 1989 a mudslide displaced thousands in Ajara (Curtis 2004, 105). Yet it is unlikely that the 
two foreign companies would invest if they considered the environmental risk to be high. 
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In order to get a construction license for hydropower plants over 13 MW, the ESIA must be 
sure that no significant environmental harm will result, and there must be measures in place to 
avoid any potential effects. Also, the land acquisition process must be completed. The activist 
at Green Alternative said that the government thought of business before environmental 
protection, and he believed the issue of licensing illustrated this. He pointed to the example of 
the Dariali hydropower project, which is similar to the two cases studied here in that it is also 
a result of the energy strategy since 2006 (menr.gov.ge). The project is financed by the United 
States and will cost approximately 135 million USD (georgianamerica.com). According to 
Green Alternative, the construction works started without the necessary permits from the 
government, meaning that the project began construction without a license. In addition, parts 
of the construction works were located in a national park. Thus, when the Ministry of 
Environment Protection gave the project permission to operate, in fact the ministry broke the 
law since it is illegal to construct in such areas. Green Alternative protested, but the Georgian 
authorities have not reacted or punished the hydropower company for starting construction in 
a protected area without a construction license (greenalt.org 2012b). 
Interestingly, a somewhat similar (although less controversial) situation occurred in one of the 
cases studied here, since the Ajar project also began construction without receiving a 
construction permit. The company’s PR manager neither denied nor confirmed this. 
Nonetheless, the timeline for the start of construction and the date when the company was 
awarded the license indicate that this situation is likely to have occurred. The construction 
phase started in October 2012, with pre-construction works beginning in the spring of 2012. 
However, the authorities granted them a licence in November that same year. This indicates 
that the Ajar project started construction before it received a construction licence. In this case 
as well there has been no penalty for starting without obtaining the correct license. Green 
Alternative believes that this demonstrates that the government is more eager to get projects 
off the ground than to ensure that the population and environment will be safe from harm. 
In contrast, the AGL project did not achieve its intended timeline for obtaining the same 
license, and the company was threatened with fines due to the delay. According to a civil 
servant at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources the AGL project would be fined, but 
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as of April 2013, no fine has been issued. Therefore, it is not clear whether the AGL project 
will eventually have to pay a fine due to the delay. The ministry has the power to fine 
companies that are delayed or where the development process has become stagnated. The 
civil servant at the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources stated that the ministry expects 
the companies to complete the projects on time. If this does not happen, the ministry will take 
some of the money out of the company’s bank guarantee to use as a source of pressure. 
Moreover, he stated that the Ministry had previous experiences with projects that had 
stagnated, and without the bank guarantee there was little the authorities could do. Therefore, 
it was important to have a means of ensuring that projects will develop. Fining based on bank 
guarantees empowers the authorities to force the foreign companies to start and complete 
projects within the contracted timeline. He also stated that this proves to foreign companies 
that Georgia is serious in its efforts, and is willing to “push them to work harder”. He added 
that the ministry has a “flexible approach” and that the completion of projects was indeed 
more important than meeting deadlines. 
Yet it is curious that the project which started without a license has not faced any 
consequences, whereas the project that received licences, albeit late and despite continually 
working for them, has been threatened with fines. The two civil servants at the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources said that they did not know the Ajar case and therefore they 
could not give an answer to this question. The activist at Green Alternative believed that 
perhaps the local authorities gave signals to the company that construction could start, even 
without the license. If so, this may indicate that the government prefers progress in 
construction rather than ensuring that environmental and social issues are being dealt with in a 
proper manner (GA 2012b, 3).  
The project coordinator at the Aarhus Centre also noted that there had been previous 
hydropower projects that started before the ESIA was completed, meaning that the 
construction works started before mitigation measures were implemented. This increased the 
possibility that the projects may have caused negative consequences that could and should 
have been avoided, if the proper time had been taken to put mitigation measures in place. The 
project coordinator further stated that this demonstrates a “pro-development approach” on the 
part of the Georgian government. More precisely, she defined this as the government ignoring 
some environmental issues in order to make it easier for businesses to start operating. As a 
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report from Green Alternative states, “conducting an environmental impact assessment after 
the launch of the activity is absolutely useless” (GA 2006, 27). At the end of the day, the 
Georgian authorities are responsible for the legal framework, and for ensuring that no 
company breaks the law and those who do are punished. 
5.4 FDI and the environment 
Many developing and emerging economies, Georgia included, have high hopes that FDI will 
generate economic growth (Zarsky 2005, 39). As discussed in the theory chapter, the effect of 
FDI on the environment depends on where it is, when it occurs and who is conducting the 
investment. 
The increasing number of regional and bilateral agreements in the last decade has promoted 
liberalisation and FDI flow. Generally, the agreements focus on the rights of the investors, but 
fail to articulate environmental or social responsibilities, either on behalf of the investor or the 
government (Zarsky 2005, 26). Some countries, including Georgia, lack the capacity or the 
political will to monitor environmental protection (GA 2006, 10). Hence, the companies 
themselves play a vital role and have several options for how they choose to conduct their 
practice. For instance, the company can choose to comply with local regulations, or it can 
choose to follow “international best practice” (Zarsky 2005, 28). This thesis argues that the 
Ajar project is an example of the former, while the AGL project is more in line with the latter.  
A report from Green Alternative (GA 2006, 28) states that it is generally better to have 
international finance institutions involved in the FDI projects. This is because such an 
involvement means the projects are not only obliged to follow national standards; they must 
also adhere to international standards, and in terms of environmental protection, the NGO 
values these standards higher than the Georgian legal framework. An example of a company 
following high standards is the AGL project in which the IFC is a co-developer, and this is 
reflected in the company’s policy (cleanenergygroup.no 2011b). The activist at Green 
Alternative stated that the AGL project was different since the company had a serious and 
comprehensive approach to pre-construction studies and the ESIA process, unlike most of the 
current greenfield hydropower projects in Georgia.  
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However, even if the AGL project has “higher” environmental standards, this only affects that 
individual project, and it is unlikely to have significant influence on the national policy (GA 
2006, 28). This may indicate that FDI can improve environmental and social standards if the 
investor embraces the principle of environmental responsibility (Zarsky 2005, 15). For 
international financial institutions, there seems to be an increasing concern about 
environmental issues. Backing from the IFC and the World Bank comes with certain 
environmental and social responsibilities attached (Zarsky 2005, 109–110). Therefore, the 
AGL project’s environmental stance not only reflects moral concerns, but also legal and 
financial concerns because the company is subject to pressure from the IFC (ibid., 109–110).  
The net effects of FDI on the environment depend on several factors, such as industry and 
company policies (Zarsky 2005, 39). The hydropower sector is not the worst polluter; except 
for emissions in the construction phase, hydropower plants are usually seen as 
environmentally friendly (Hanley and Barbier 2009, 285). 
5.5 Employment  
In an effort to promote hydropower developments among the Georgian population, in 2012 
the government advertised that the new hydropower plants would create thirteen thousand 
new jobs (myvideo.ge). At the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the head of the 
Investment Projects division listed the creation of jobs as the main benefit of greenfield 
hydropower projects. This section will discuss the labour market situation and employment 
opportunities in the two cases. 
One of Georgia’s major struggles since independence has been the situation in the labour 
market, particularly the high unemployment rate. According to the EDBI the labour market is 
classified as “flexible”, meaning it is easy to hire and fire employees and working hours are 
flexible (doingbusiness.org 2013b). Georgia is known for having one of the most liberal 
labour codes in the world, but it is open to debate whether the liberal framework improves the 
labour market in Georgia (nbiexpo.com). 
Although Georgia has a high literacy rate of 99,7% and a large percentage of the population is 
educated at university level, there are challenges. In addition to patterns of long-term 
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unemployment, there has been a high labour migration rate since independence, and the skills 
are outdated (Jones 2013, 201). For a large proportion of the population the labour market 
consists of few jobs, low wages and weak labour protection (Jones 2013, 203). Hence, a 
positive effect of FDI would be the creation of new and stable employment opportunities for 
the local population. Indeed, countries that attract and retain FDI are able to improve the 
employment situation in the country, although this is not something that will happen 
automatically (Lee and Vivarelli 2004, 337). Foreign companies can employ people directly, 
but FDI can also have an indirect affect by creating jobs among suppliers and in the service 
sector (Lee and Vivarelli 2004, 376–7). Jones (2013, 181) asks if FDI in Georgia will lead to 
the “retention of native skilled personnel and provide training for future industries”. He 
doubts that it will, arguing that the preconditions are not there in the case of Georgia, e.g. 
when it comes to the labour code (ibid.). 
In Georgia, the labour code has changed dramatically since the revolution, although from 
2011 there has been no further reform and neither has the minimum wage increased in years 
(doingbusiness.org 2013b). The minimum wage for workers and apprentices still stands at 
21.7 USD/month (WB 2013, 101). The amendments to the labour codes include “making the 
cost for hiring and firing workers very low” (investinbatumi.ge 2012). The aim of the 
amendments was to decrease the unemployment rate within the labour market, but the liberal 
reforms have not helped to reduce the high rate (Shvelidze 2012, 16). While limiting the 
rights of employees, the rights of employers have been substantially broadened. As Papava 
notes, this might encourage business to develop, but on the other hand it also leaves 
employees unprotected (2006, 201). One could thus argue that the labour code might be good 
from an investor’s point of view, but it is not helpful for an employee to get few benefits and 
weak contract protection (Jones 2013, 202). Interestingly, two Georgian employees at AGL’s 
Batumi office said that one of the benefits of working with the projects was employment 
stability. They perceived this benefit despite the fact that at the time the project had not 
reached financial closure, and nor had it obtained a construction license, which still meant that 
the project might not go ahead. This reflects the instability of the Georgian labour market 
rather than a certainty that the project would move forward.  
Officially the unemployment rate in Georgia stands at 15.1%, while the unemployment rate in 
Ajara stands at 16%, a little above the national average (geostat.ge 2011). The numbers do not 
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reflect the realities of the labour market, as the Georgian Law on Employment defines anyone 
living in a rural area with one hectare of land as self-employed. Accordingly, a large 
percentage of farmers are classed as employed even though they are living at a subsistence 
level. Therefore, Jones (2013, 202) argues that the high level of rural employment is a 
statistical manipulation. The rural population classed as employed do not pay taxes, but then 
again they are deprived of state benefits (Jones 2013, 202). Additionally, the statistics do not 
reflect the general perception of the population. In a survey from 2011, 67% of the people 
considered themselves unemployed (Jones 2013, 202). The definition of employment might 
make the labour situation Georgia look acceptable, but it avoids addressing the challenges of 
economic and social development. 
5.5.1 Hydropower and employment 
There is reason to believe that the actual unemployment rate is high in the rural regions where 
the two hydropower projects are constructed, so that job training and employment 
possibilities could be changes for the better. Both projects state an intention to improve the 
affected communities by offering temporary and permanent jobs (UNFCCC 2006, 3). While 
the construction phases of the projects may offer employment possibilities, many of the jobs 
are short-term in nature and it is not clear how many permanent jobs will be created. In the 
context of constructing hydropower schemes, it is worth noting that potential growth areas 
such as construction are often divided into time-limited projects and accordingly, hydropower 
projects are not major long-term employees (Jones 2013, 202).  
In addition, the interviewee at Green Alternative noted that while many jobs will be created, it 
is not certain that Georgians will be employed. He pointed out that foreign workers have 
conducted many of the recent major construction projects in Georgia. An example from Ajara 
is the construction of several five-star hotels in Batumi, where Turkish entrepreneurs and 
mainly Turkish workers have been involved in the construction works. Georgia is a member 
of the International Labour Organisation, and investors are guaranteed permission to hire 
foreign workers who are permitted to transfer their earnings abroad once they have complied 
with Georgian duties (nbiexpo.com). Flexibility of labour across borders might be a location 
advantage for investors; for example, it facilities the movement of Turkish workers, who are 
considered highly skilled and relatively cheap. 
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Some Georgians have expressed discontent with this development (georgiatimes.info). In 
other construction projects the Georgians who were employed have not been content with the 
working environment under foreign management (vestikavkaza.ru). Transparency Batumi 
noted that some companies involved in hydropower construction would probably hire 
Georgian workers, since this would be a useful social policy for improving the working 
relationship with local authorities and municipalities. The head of the Investment Projects 
Division at the Ministry of Energy and Environment believed that Georgia would benefit if 
foreign investors employed Georgians. He said that in several cases this provision was 
included in the project planning, whereas in other cases it was put forward as a 
recommendation from the ministry. He further stated that it makes sense for foreign investors 
to employ locals, since by doing so the risk that affected municipalities might object to the 
hydropower project would decrease. The interviewee at Green Alternative suggested that 
requirements should be stated in contracts with foreign companies to ensure that a certain 
percentage of locals must be employed, as this would guarantee at least some benefit for the 
Georgian population.  
Still, regulations might not be the answer. As the director of Gamma Consulting noted, it 
would be difficult to follow up on whether the companies have employed Georgians or not. 
The liberal laws and the current labour market do not provide Georgian employees with much 
job security, as noted earlier in this chapter. It is easy to write false contracts and it is easy to 
fire workers. The head of the Investment Project Division at the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources admitted that it would be a challenge to control how many local workers 
were employed and for how long a period. The coordinator at the Aarhus Centre agreed with 
this assessment, but stated that if Georgians were not hired during the construction and 
operation of the plants, it would be hard to imagine anyone in Georgia besides the investor 
benefitting from the greenfield projects. The next section will take a closer look at the 




5.5.2 Employment in the projects 
The Ajar project has hired local Georgians both at the main office in Batumi and at the 
construction site. According to the PR manager, in March 2013 the company had 
approximately five hundred people working on the project. At the time of the interview the 
company had entered the construction phase of the project, hence the large number of 
workers. She said there were roughly equal numbers of Georgians and Turks working on the 
construction of the hydropower plants. Most of the Georgians came from Ajara, and several 
of them were from the affected areas. The PR manager said the company aimed at hiring as 
many Georgians as possible, but noted that it had been a challenge to find enough skilled 
Georgians in the local areas.  
The company has also contributed indirect employment, for instance by hiring the Georgian 
engineering company Gamma Consulting to conduct the social and environmental studies for 
the project. The projects has utilised Georgian expertise, in contrast to the Ajar project that 
chose to cooperate with an international engineering firm. The anonymous interviewee said 
that Gamma Consulting was the best Georgian option for these assignments, but nevertheless 
the company’s standards were not excellent. International companies may be better equipped 
to handle hydropower evaluation, something that might suggest a contradiction between 
economic (jobs) and environmental interest when conducting environmental studies. The Ajar 
project indirectly contributes to the labour market by supporting a sector outside construction 
and uses Georgian employees with high technical skills (Lee and Vivarelli 2004, 376–7). The 
director of Gamma Consulting noted the lack of skills in demand among Georgians, 
particularly at a high level. He said that the Gamma trained its employees and university 
students, but this was only on a limited scale.  
In November 2012 the informant at AGL project said that the company currently employed 
somewhere between thirty and forty Georgians. This number would increase significantly 
when the construction phase of the project began. In addition to the main office in Batumi the 
AGL project has also opened an office in one of the affected villages, where locals have been 
hired. The AGL project has conducted so-called skills mapping in the affected areas to map 
the skills of the local population. The map showed that there was a demand for training in the 
area, and that, perhaps unsurprisingly, there was a large amount of interest in the employment 
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possibilities the company said it would offer. Furthermore, the skills map might have served 
to promote employment opportunities, thereby positively influencing the population’s 
perception of the project. Nevertheless, what makes this project stand out from most other 
greenfield construction projects is the vocational training that the company offers to a section 
of the local population.  
On February 1, 2013 the AGL project opened a vocational training centre in the municipality 
of Shuakhevi. According to the informant at the AGL project, the aim of the centre is to train 
local residents in different construction skills and provide courses that could lead to 
employment during the construction of the hydropower project. The courses have a two-
months duration, are practically oriented and are run by instructors from a vocational college 
in Ajara. The total cost of the training is financed by the AGL project, and the first round of 
training offers courses for welders, electricians and heavy machinery operators. The training 
centre has recruited forty-five locals so far and they are well into their training, according to 
the AGL informant. The next course started in April 2013 with the training of general 
labourers. By summer 2013 the AGL project intends to run two shifts and train ninety 
students at the same time, and the plan is to train approximately six hundred local residents in 
total (adjaristsqali.com 2013b). 
As noted by both companies, there is a lack of skilled Georgians, which is a challenge that 
prevails in the entire country. A survey from 2008 among foreign investors in Georgia singles 
out the lack of trained and available workers as the largest obstacle in the way of investing in 
Georgia, and the lack of skilled workers in technical jobs was particularly noted (Gursoy 
2008, 23–24). The Georgian vocational education system fell apart after the break up of the 
Soviet Union, leaving the sector with an outdated curriculum and courses that did not reflect 
the current and future demand for skills (Haug 2012, 9). Reform measures were introduced in 
2005, but the reforms did not deal with all the problems related to the outdated vocational 
training sector. With several large construction projects happening all over Georgia, the 
government has done too little to update the skills and education of the population, with the 
consequence that fewer Georgians are able find employment in construction developments.  
Since independence, Georgia has not paid enough attention to vocational and technical 
training, which is unfortunate for investors who will have difficulty finding skilled local 
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workers. It is also unfortunate for Georgian workers who are seeing more foreigners 
employed in construction projects in Georgia (Gursoy 2008, 32). Several foreign companies 
have stated that they intend to hire Georgians but they do not follow through in practice. The 
reason may be the lack of skilled Georgian workers, combined with easy access to a foreign 
workforce. For instance, it would be simple for the Ajar project, as a Turkish company 
operating close to the Turkish border, to find the work skills needed just over the border. In 
addition, another consequence that can be seen all over the construction sector in Georgia is 
that it is usually only foreign companies that are ready to compete in tenders, and they might 
tend to hire foreigners over Georgians (Gursoy 2008, 24). 
In conclusion, Jones might have been right in being sceptical of the notion that FDI will 
improve the labour market situation in Georgia. As discussed above, there is a lack of skills, 
and the current labour code leaves employees vulnerable. Nevertheless, the projects have 
offered employment opportunities for locals, and thus have had a positive impact on the local 
municipalities. By offering vocational training, the AGL project enhances the employment 
possibilities in the development, and perhaps in future construction projects elsewhere in 
Georgia. The final part of this chapter will deal with the relationship between the foreign 
investor and the local population. 
5.6 Local stakeholder consultation 
Public meetings are conducted during the EISA phase, as required by law. The meetings are 
held by the companies and not by external experts in the field. In the public meetings the 
affected population gets the opportunity to express their views directly to the investors, which 
is in accordance with the Aarhus Convention. Nonetheless, Green Alternative does not 
consider the meetings to constitute participation in the decision-making process; rather, they 
appear to function as information provision. According to Green Alternative, most decisions 
have already been made prior to the public meeting. The law provides access to information, 
but in practice there are several shortcomings (GA 2011, 41–42). The coordinator at the 
Aarhus Centre stated that the poor level of information available to the local population was a 
challenge in the greenfield construction projects. 
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According to the associate professor interviewed for this study, the local population might 
have historic reasons to distrust what they have been told by the authorities and remain 
sceptical of companies’ promises. While distrust of politicians can be found all over the 
world, some of the causes and consequences in this situation relate to Georgia’s status as a 
post-soviet society (Rose 2009, 211). Some of the frequent concerns related to the planned 
construction works are the increased risks of potential flooding and landslides (UNFCCC 
2006, 37). In the past, locals who have been forced to move due to environmental disasters 
have often been discontented with their new locations (humanrights.ge). As mentioned in 
Chapter Four, there is no clear resettlement policy, which leaves the population vulnerable. 
Therefore, it is understandable that the population is sceptical of the greenfield hydropower 
projects. Still, it is unlikely that companies would invest if they knew there was a 
considerable risk of natural disasters, as this could be costly. The law also prohibits any 
harmful projects from moving to the construction phase. 
5.6.1 Public consulting in the cases 
Both projects have conducted several public meetings and provided information in the 
affected areas. The main questions of concern were related to the risk of landslide, 
employment possibilities and resettlement issues. The question of the implementation of a 
reduced electricity tariff for local residents was also brought up (UNFCCC 2012, 54). 
Nevertheless, the interviewee at Green Alternative said that the NGO is not satisfied with the 
level of information, because the people in the affected area remain sceptical and concerned. 
The Greens Movement also believed the information received by the affected population in 
the larger construction projects tended to be insufficient. Both companies have held public 
meetings in the affected areas as required by law. Still, there have been incidents that illustrate 
that information has not always been available, and hence the affected population is left out of 
the decision process. 
The spokesperson at the Ajar project said that they had conducted public meetings as 
required, but apart from these events the company have not held any other meetings with the 
local population. She said it was not something that the company found particularly useful for 
either stakeholder. The company found other methods to be more constructive, and has hired 
a person who lives in the affected area to communicate information from the Batumi office to 
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the local municipalities. Thus, most of the communication was done through a third party and 
there was little direct communication between the company and the local population..  
The officer at Transparency Batumi said there had been an incident with the Ajar project 
where a lack of information had caused discontent amongst some of the local population. The 
Ajar project had an unfortunate occurrence where they marked the planned reservoirs without 
consulting the affected population first. In April 2012, some of the locals found marks in their 
gardens and were angered with the company for trespassing on their private property and also 
shocked at how close the water of the reservoirs would be to their houses. Not surprisingly, 
the affected population felt left out of the decision-making process. As both the Greens 
Movement and Green Alternative point out, it is most common that the locals are informed 
after the decisions have been made. Thus, they have little opportunity to influence the 
decision-making process. According to the officer at Transparency Batumi, the local 
population was also worried about compensation, about which at the time they had heard 
nothing. She stated that she did not believe this was intentional on the part of the company; 
the company had said that it assumed the local authorities had informed the municipalities. 
Transparency Batumi considered the Ajar project to be open to communication, and deemed 
the incident an honest mistake. Even if it was not intentional, however, such an incident 
should have been avoided because it created suspicion among the population. The incident 
shows that adequate and timely information for the affected population is vital, and a lack of 
it can cause unnecessary worries. It also illustrates the poor level of information received by 
the local people, and Transparency Batumi believes that these sorts of incidents can lead to 
mistrust of both the local authorities and the foreign company involved, but they can and 
should be avoided.  
When it comes to the projects’ relationships to the population, AGL operates closer to the 
principles of the Aarhus Convention. This probably has to with that fact that the IFC is a part 
of the project, and thus the company follows IFC standards. IFC influences is reflected in 
several areas, including the relationship with the affected population, e.g. in terms of access to 
information; as the IFC states, “transparency is essential to building and maintaining public 
dialogue” (ifc.org). The informant at the AGL project said that the company had placed 
letterboxes in the affected municipalities, which the locals can use to address their questions 
about the project and express grievances. Every second week, someone from AGL goes go up 
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to the valley to check the boxes, but the company has hardly received any letters. This is 
perhaps because a letter-writing provision does not reflect the realities of mountain regions, 
since most Georgians prefer to call when they have questions
19
. Indeed, the AGL informant 
said the company have received several phone inquiries, and the questions were more or less 
the same as the ones asked when the company conducts a hold public meeting. The AGL 
reports that almost all villages seemed positive, though this is likely due to the prospect of 
training and employment opportunities.  
The AGL project held several public meetings in the affected areas in June 2012. Through 
invitations in the local media, the local stakeholders were invited to attend the meetings to 
obtain information and ask questions. Other interested parties, such as the interviewee at 
Green Alternative, also attended (UNFCCC 2012, 54). The employee at the AGL office said 
that some of the affected population had expressed concerns about the possibility of 
landslides. They wanted guarantees that the construction work would not cause landslides, 
and if it did, they wanted to know how the company planned to compensate the local 
municipalities.  
The difference between the approaches in the two cases leads to the question of why 
companies choose to follow different approaches in the same setting. The Ajar project abides 
by its obligations according to the law, but does little more. Of course, it is up to the Georgian 
authorities to set adequate standards, following them up with monitoring and punishment if 
the projects do not live up to the standards. However, the AGL project has standards that 
might be considered higher than the national law code.  
Concerning public relations, the AGL project might have incentives to act according to “best 
international standards”, while the Ajar project may not have the same incentives. An 
example would be the projects’ relationships with the press. There are more controversial 
projects in Turkey (guardian.co.uk), and therefore it is unlikely that this project will attract 
any press in the home country. For the AGL project, negative media attention might be a 
slightly more important issue. The media in Norway is keener on exposing Norwegian 
companies’ misconduct abroad. Indeed, in 2011 one journalist published an article in the 
online version of a Norwegian newspaper. The article was soon withdrawn because the 
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 Phone is a by far the most effective way to get a hold of someone in Georgia. Not all answer their mail but 
everyone seems to answer their phone, something also experienced under my stay in Georgia in November 2012. 
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journalist could not prove his statements, but nevertheless, even unfounded accusations might 
harm the project. The AGL project has a stronger motivation for acting well and receiving 
good press reviews. The project is an IFC co-operation, and if the project is badly conducted, 
the worst-case scenario would be that the IFC/World Bank might pull out. Being the very first 
project conducted by the company, it is likely that the management team will wish to be able 
to exhibit a successful project. An ownership advantage might include a good reputation 
(Bjorvatn 2001, 2), something that would come in handy should the companies desire to enter 
further hydropower tenders in Georgia in the future.  
5.7 Conclusion 
The findings in this chapter suggest that environmental protection has not been a priority for 
the Georgian government and that the greenfield development has not contributed to putting 
the environmental issues higher on the political agenda. In fact, the empirical evidence shows 
that the eagerness to start on the greenfield hydropower projects has overshadowed 
environmental concerns. In the two cases, this was illustrated with the issue of construction 
licensing, where the Ajar project started construction without the necessary license but was 
given no consequences. In contrast, the AGL project was threatened with fines for not abiding 
by the planned construction start date. Nevertheless, as all stakeholders interviewed, apart 
from the two local NGOs, believe that the environmental legal framework is adequate. Still, 
the real challenge is the implementation and the monitoring of environmental protection.  
Regarding the Georgian workforce, both companies have noted a lack of skilled local 
workers. Yet both companies have employed local Georgians because this is part of the 
companies’ social policy.. The AGL project has dealt with this by establishing a vocational 
training centre in a village in the affected region. This is further related to the AGL project’s 
social profile, which is influenced by the company having the IFC as a co-developer.  
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6 Concluding remarks 
In this final chapter I will present the main findings of the thesis. I will return to the questions 
asked in the introduction and examine them in the light of the theoretical framework and the 
empirical data. The main research question was in what ways the search for FDI in the 
hydropower sector have an impact on the society. In short, the findings indicate that some 
environmental and social aspects have come in the background in terms of political 
prioritising and the neoliberal-inspired reforms implemented in order to promote greenfield 
hydropower development. A more in-depth discussion follows below. 
After the Rose Revolution, several sectors in Georgia went through considerable change, 
including the electricity sector. This thesis has argued that Georgia has followed a neoliberal 
inspired policy path since 2003, which can be observed in the deregulation and simplification 
measures introduced and the impressive climbing in the EDBI. In 2006 the government 
declared its intention to utilise the domestic hydropower potential. With policies such as 
reducing bureaucratic procedures and announcing a call for international tenders, reforms in 
the electricity sector were clearly aimed at attracting FDI. The reforms yielded quantitative 
success since the country soon managed to attract several foreign investors, including the two 
cases examined in this thesis. Nevertheless, some of the stakeholders have expressed concerns 
about the developments, saying that the government has been too business-friendly and 
questioning the need for and the reasoning behind the large-scale greenfield hydropower 
developments that have been commissioned since 2006. 
Like many other emerging economies, Georgia has high hopes for FDI’s effect on economic 
growth. However, as shown in the theory section, the relationship between FDI and economic 
growth is not automatically beneficial, and there is no certainty that FDI will improve the 
economic, social or environmental situation in Georgia. The stable supply of electricity even 
in the winter months is an achievement, but it does not solve the overall question of energy 
supply. As electricity only accounts for a quarter of the country’s total energy consumption, 
any additional FDI greenfield capacity will only have a limited impact on energy 
diversification. Moreover, it is still too early to foresee what impact the hydropower projects 
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will have, for example it is difficult to estimate the exact revenue income from property 
taxation from the two companies. 
The comprehensive reforms in Georgia have not gone unnoticed by the rest of the world; one 
great achievement was being named the number one reformer in the world by the World 
Bank. Georgia is perhaps the best regional performer, but the accolade of the globe’s best 
performer might seem to be somewhat of an overstatement since the statistics do not always 
reflect the reality. There are many benefits of doing business in Georgia – streamlined 
bureaucracy, reduced corruption and so on. Still, as this thesis has argued, it is not as easy 
doing business in Georgia as the EDBI suggests. Perhaps it is time to look for inspirational 
sources other than the Washington Consensus-based approach of the EDBI. Georgia’s 
strategy for attracting FDI had been inspired by neoliberal ideas, and since the country 
already had secured several hydropower investments, now is possibly the time to be more 
selective in terms of announcing new project tenders and choosing the companies that will be 
granted concessions. Still, Georgia must remain an attractive investments destination if it 
wants to successfully compete in the global competition for FDI. 
Chapter Four started with examining the reforms Georgia has implemented in order to 
become an attractive location for greenfield hydropower projects. The OLI paradigm, 
combining the local advantages of Georgia with the ownership and internalisation advantages 
of the two companies, helps to explain why the two companies choose to become foreign 
investors in Georgia’s greenfield hydropower sector. Yet, it does not explain why Georgia 
should opt to attract investors, nor does it deal with how the state should benefit from FDI. As 
discussed in the theory section, the neoliberal approach assumes an unquestioned belief in 
FDI. With few regulations and low taxation, the potential spillover effects of the FDI 
hydropower projects depends a great deal on the companies themselves. This is in accordance 
with the neoliberal approach, in which a goal is to increase the company’s influence and 
diminish that of the state. Some of the advantages in the OLI paradigm are discussed below. 
As noted, domestic electricity demand could be satisfied by the rehabilitation of existing 
hydropower plants and energy saving measures, and accordingly the Georgian market is not 
particularly attractive. However, the location advantage of Georgia is significantly increased 
when the Turkish market is added to the equation. In addition to being a large energy market, 
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Turkish retail tariffs are higher than in Georgia, and growth rates have been high for years. 
Both projects will export most of the electricity they produce to Turkey, and for that reason 
the location advantages of the Turkish market have to be considered. Moreover, the location 
of the projects allows the companies to utilise their management and internalisation 
advantages. The two companies have certain expertise which gives them a comparative 
advantage over other potential investors – the Ajar project is close to both the Georgian and 
Turkish markets, and the AGL project has a former advisor to the Georgian minister of energy 
and natural resources in the company’s management team. Nevertheless, there are also some 
challenges with operating in the Georgian electricity market. For instance, a drawback is that 
the tariffs in Georgia have been low, which is not beneficial for investors. Still, investors can 
negotiate a profitable price with the state agency GNERC. It remains to be seen if GNERC 
will honour its promised tariff rates to the investors, or whether it will be politically pressured 
to keep prices low.  
According to the EDBI, Georgia is ranked thirty-third out of 185 countries when it comes to 
tax reforms. Simplification measures have increased revenue collection, and thus the tax 
reforms can be seen as successful, despite Georgia’s relatively low score in the ranking. 
Regarding taxation one should keep in mind that greenfield hydropower projects are a long-
term investment. Though two local environmental NGOs expressed beliefs that the 
developments would not generate much revenue, the estimates from the projects indicate 
otherwise; the tax revenues from property would seem to have a significant and long-term 
effect on income for the local municipalities. By attracting FDI the government will increase 
the budget revenue, which is a positive impact on the Georgian society.  
In contrast to the tax ranking, the EDBI ranked Georgia first out of all the competing 
countries when it comes to property protection. In the light of the findings in this thesis, the 
EDBI ranking does not reflect the Georgian reality. Property was reported to be the most 
difficult issue by all the interviewed stakeholders, and the land acquisition process has proven 
complicated and time-consuming for both cases. It is reasonable to believe that this challenge 
is common to all greenfield hydropower projects that are located in rural areas, clearly 
including the two cases. Often the residents in rural areas have not registered their property; 
there are several reasons why this may be the case, but the main one is the difficulty of doing 
so. Selective land registration processes, for example when the affected population in the Ajar 
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project were suddenly able to register land just before the 2012 election and the following 
unsettled legal situation after the election, are not favourable either for foreign investors or for 
the Georgian population. This situation creates a level of political risk that makes Georgia less 
attractive for potential investors, and additionally prevents the Georgian population from 
gaining access to their legal rights. Despite the EDBI suggesting that property is not an issue, 
this thesis has shown that it has been the major challenge for all the stakeholders. The 
government’s policy regarding property is though successful in one respect, namely ascending 
on the EDBI. However, the government has in reality introduced few real improvements.  
Generally, the World Bank has shifted toward a so-called post-Washington Consensus policy, 
which is more socially inclusive. The organisation has a resettlement policy and 
acknowledges traditional land users. This policy could also be suitable for Georgia, where the 
population in the country’s mountainous areas often lives on unregistered land. Influenced by 
the IFC and the World Bank, the AGL project does not distinguish between registered 
landowners and those who have been living on unregistered state-owned land. This approach 
is perhaps better suited for the Georgian reality than the EDBI ranking’s one-size-fits-all 
approach. In addition, the government could consider a new resettlement law that protects 
vulnerable populations in rural areas. Protection of property right is at the core of a well-
functioning market and Georgia is in this respect still struggling. As this thesis has shown, the 
status of property rights is unsettled, which affects the stakeholders in a negative way.  
Chapter Five began with a look at how the developments in the hydropower related sector 
may influence the protection of the environment. Legal amendments and the restructuring of 
ministers suggest that the political drive for hydropower developments might have 
overshadowed environmental perspectives. The moving of the governance of natural 
resources to the Ministry of Energy might point towards a change in attitude, but it should be 
noted that there is nothing questionable about a government wanting to utilise natural 
resources. Several countries have hydropower departments governed by the energy ministry, 
Turkey and Norway included. What is more concerning is the issue of construction licensing, 
which is indicative of the government’s attitude toward environmental issues. One of the main 
findings of the thesis was that the Ajar project started the construction phase without a 
license, but there was no penalty from the Georgian authorities for breaching this 
requirement. On the other hand, the AGL project was pressured to reach the construction 
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phase, as the company was threatened with fines for not achieving the planned construction 
start deadline. This is an indicator that the government is more focused on getting hydropower 
plants started than on protecting the environment in the development process. 
Another finding was that the AGL project has a higher environmental standard than the 
Georgian legal framework. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether one project can influence 
environmental policy at a national level. Still, if the government gives preference to 
companies with a “best practice” standard when granting concessions, this will in reality 
make an overall impact over time. The Ajar project mostly acts according to the national 
environmental framework, and as such it makes little impact on the environmental standards 
one way or the other. Neither of the two cases are likely to have a negative environmental 
impact. Both projects have taken their environmental commitments seriously, and no major 
harm is foreseen. At the same time, the main concern of local environmental NGOs is 
whether the projects will impact the Black Sea coastline. If the NGOs are right, the 
consequences will only become apparent once the hydropower stations are constructed. In 
terms of whether FDI has influenced environmental policy for better or for worse, the answer 
remains ambiguous. 
The population will be affected in various ways. In the context of the government’s neoliberal 
approach potential spillover effects depend much on the companies’ policies and actions. One 
of the largest potential impacts on society will be the improvement of the unemployment 
rates, which has been a major struggle for Georgia. Employment opportunities will certainly 
be created with the greenfield constructions; the question is whether Georgians will be 
employed. Despite the government claiming they have skilled Georgian workers, the reality is 
that the skills are not available according to demand and the labour situation can be 
considered a challenge rather than a location advantage. When the AGL project decided to 
train locals it indicated that the company does not expects to find enough skilled local 
workers, but it was looking for a way to employ locals in the construction phase of the 
project.  
Returning to the EDBI as a tool for comparing theory and practice, the index measures the 
“flexibility” of employment, and the Georgian labour code is very flexible indeed with 
regards to working hours and to hiring and firing workers. However, as foreign investors are 
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not legally obliged to employ Georgians, it is up to the companies whether they decide to do 
so. A difficulty is that the lack of skilled Georgians might contribute to the companies 
choosing to import the workforce required. Therefore, the AGL project’s vocational training 
centre is an important measure to help the company employ local Georgians. The Ajar project 
also employs Georgians, and it had a more significant indirect effect by using a local 
engineering firm. The two cases in this thesis show that these greenfield projects could have a 
positive impact on development, because they both have a social policy of employing 
Georgians. However, while these particular cases are likely to have a positive impact, they do 
not necessarily reflect every other greenfield project. Yet another challenge is training at a 
higher level, and it will be interesting to see if there will be any spillover effect in terms of 
skills transferred from the more experienced Turkish and Norwegian employers to the 
Georgian employees. Generally, positive impact on local development will depend on if the 
hydropower investor chooses a predominantly local workforce over a foreign one. 
Consequently, the two companies in this thesis are likely to have a positive impact because 
they employ locals. Nevertheless, this outcome have not come about because directly from 
the government but rather from the companies’ social policy.   
The two companies have informed the local people according to their legal requirements by 
conducting public meetings. Yet, Green Alternative thinks the population is not a real part of 
the decision making process; rather, they are merely passive listeners at these public 
meetings. General concerns about increased tariffs, environmental harm and compensation 
were expressed in the public meetings. The Ajar project had an incident in the summer 2012 
where the company marked the private land it expected to be flooded before consulting the 
affected landowners. It illustrates a lack of communication between the company and the 
affected population. The AGL project had letterboxes placed in the affected areas, but people 
still preferred other means for expressing concerns. All in all, it is likely that the two projects 
will not affect the population in a significant way; no one will lose their home, and no 
culturally important sites are to be flooded. Thus, the two cases are not among the most 
controversial ongoing construction projects in Georgia. 
Returning to the main question of the thesis, there have been incidents where environmental 
and social aspects of greenfield hydropower developments have been given less attention. 
Hence, the quest for FDI have some negative consequences. Climbing the EDBI has come at 
the expense of much needed reform, for instance, to improve labour rights and introduce 
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adequate resettlement laws. The EDBI has throughout the thesis been a useful tool to illustrate 
reform efforts of the government to make Georgia an attractive investment destination, but the 
two cases exemplified that the ranking does not tell the whole truth about doing business in 
Georgia.  
In conclusion, though improvements have been made, there is still some way to go before 
every Georgian feels the benefits of development achievements in the energy sector. FDI can 
play a role in Georgia’s socio-economic development, but the key word here is “can”. As this 
thesis has shown, the government has been eager to become make Georgia an attractive place 
for foreign investments and the drive to obtain FDI has placed concerns about environmental 
and social aspects of Georgian society in the background. The reforms have to great extend 
focused on attracting FDI, and less effort has been made to ensure environmental protection 
or improvements of the population’s lives. For instance, when it comes to property issues it 
remains clear that there has been little real progress. Still, the picture is complex, and all the 
potential impacts may not yet be evident. With a new government in 2012 and a new 
president in 2013, Georgia might yet again embark on a new policy path, perhaps towards a 
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